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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Commercial banks are an important source of credit for 
agricultural borrowers. Over the past three decades, the 
volume of farm debt held by commercial banks rose from $3.8 
billion in 1950 to $53 billion in 1979. Most of this in­
crease took place over the last decade, particularly since 
1975, as farm debt owed to bernks rose at a 10.5 percent annual 
rate. However, farm debt owed to all other institutional 
lenders rose at a 17 percent annual rate since 1975. Because 
of the slower growth in bêuik lending, the market share of farm 
debt owed to beuiks declined sharply from 40 percent in 1975 to 
33 percent in 1979. That is the smallest market share for 
banks in the post-World War II era. Banks' market share had 
been as high as 50 percent in the early 1950s. 
Part of the loss in market share is due to competitive 
imbalances that favor other lenders. The Farm Credit System, 
a prime competitor of agricultural banks in the farm loan 
market, has a competitive edge because of its exemption from 
usury ceilings and its tax advantages. Government agencies 
that lend to farmers (Commodity Credit Corporation, Farmers' 
Home Administration, and the Small Business Administration) 
also have those advantages, plus recent mandates from Congress 
and the Administration provide for special loams to farmers 
from those government agencies. Loss in market share also is 
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tied to liquidity pressures that began building at banks 
in the late 1970s, particularly at rural banks. Evidence 
of liquidity pressures at rural banks usually appears as a 
rise in loan-to-deposit ratios. Ratios at agricultural 
banks rose sharply in recent years as banks tried to meet 
strong loan demamd while growth in sources of funds slowed. 
Loan-to-deposit ratios at agricultural banks averaged 67 
percent in 1978, compared with averages of 54 to 56 percent 
in the early 1970s. 
Third, loss in market share is related to the legal 
lending limits on the maximum that banks can extend to indi­
vidual borrowers. Legal lending limits differ for nationally 
emd state-chartered banks. For nationally-chartered banks, 
the legal limit is 10 percent of a bank's capital and 
surplus account. For state-chartered banks, the limit 
varies from 15 to 20 percent of a bank's capital and sur­
plus account. 
As credit demands of individual borrowers have in­
creased and pressed against lending limits, banks have po­
tentially been restricted in their ability to service those 
customers. In a recent survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, only 4 percent of the agricultural banks in the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District reported they had fewer 
customers with credit needs in excess of the bank's lending 
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limit than five years earlier. Nearly 50 percent of the 
agricultural banks in the Seventh Federal Reserve District had 
lending limits of $100,000 or less, which would prove quite 
restrictive for the borrowing requirements of many farmers 
in the Midwest. A similar study (Riffe, 1979), examined 
lending limits in Texas, where farm size and borrowing 
requirements are larger than in the Midwest. The results 
of that study showed that roughly half of the agricultural 
banks in Texas had loan limits below $200,000. 
The trend of increasing individual borrowing require­
ments appears as if it will continue in the future. The 
continuing decline in farm numbers in the 1970s, along with 
the rapid growth in the prices of purchased inputs, has led 
to growth in farm debt and to a greater concentration of 
debt. Preliminary indications (Benjamin, 1980) are that 
per-farm debt êunong units with annual sales of $20,000 or 
more may be close to $200,000. Debt-to-asset ratios also 
rose from 9.2 percent in 1950 to 18 percent in 1979. With 
the decline in farm numbers, the average size farm in the 
United States also increased over this time span, from 216 
acres in 1950 to approximately 490 acres in 1979. Thus, 
fewer farmers farming larger units, inflation in input prices, 
and a trend to heavier use of debt by farm operators, combine 
to generate larger credit volume requests by individual 
borrowers. 
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Matched against this growth in borrowing requirements 
is a slower growth in bank capital at rural banks. Growth in 
rural bank capital has averaged 6 percent annually in the 
1970s. Thus, with capital at rural banks growing more slowly 
than the demand for credit, the increased borrowing needs 
of agriculture have pressed against the lending limits that 
banks c«m extend to individual borrowers. 
If a rural bank cannot satisfy agricultural loan demand 
because of lending limit problems, then typically the rural 
bank has incorporated loan participations with correspondent 
banks to meet overline requests. In general, both the rural 
bank and the correspondent bank carry portions of the loam, 
with the correspondent bank compensated by demand balances 
held on deposit by the rural beuik. However, several studies 
(American Banker's Association, Benjamin, Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors) have shown that these loan participations 
are costly and detrimental to rural banks in that a net out­
flow of funds, rather than a net inflow, has resulted. It 
has been estimated (by the American Banker's Association, 1976) 
that rural banks hold $4 in balances to every $1 they receive 
in loan participations from urban banks. The American 
Banker's Association concludes that because of this outflow 
of funds, rural banks experienced a decline in their 
profitability levels when they employed correspondent loans. 
With present lending limit regulations, the potential for 
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unsatisfied loan demand by farm customers exists. If so, then 
rural banks will be engaged in a form of credit rationing 
over which they have no control. With ever-increasing farm 
sizes, the credit rationing problem could become even more 
crucial in the future, especially if that farm size growth 
is accompanied by slow growth in bank capital. 
The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to develop a 
simple theoretical market model that incorporates and investi­
gates the effect of legal lending limits on the ability of 
rural banks to accommodate loan demand; and (2) to provide 
empirical evidence concerning the effects of lending limits 
on the availability of credit to agricultural borrowers. 
The analysis will be confined to an investigation of the 
ability of banks to internally satisfy loan demand. No formal 
analysis will be made of the role that external lending 
arrêmgements through correspondent balances play in satis­
fying credit requests of farmers. 
Chapter II reviews some of the literature on lending 
limits, credit rationing, bank capital growth, and trends in 
farm size that is relevant to the issue of credit accommoda­
tions to farm firms, while Chapter III presents a theoretical 
model that incorporates lending limits, bank capital growth 
and changes in the size structure of farms. Chapter IV con­
tains an empirical adaptation of the theoretical model 
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developed in Chapter III and Chapter V contains empirical 
evidence regarding the effects of lending limits on the avail­
ability of credit to agricultural borrowers. Finally, Chapter 
VI provides the conclusions and summary of the study, and 
offers some insights into possible policy prescriptions for 
the banking sector. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this chapter, a review of the literature on lending 
limits and their relationship to credit rationing is pre­
sented. The first section of this chapter contains a review 
of the legal basis for lending limits. Then, two Federal 
Reserve studies which present factual data on lending 
limits are examined. The last section discusses some 
topics related to the lending limit problem—credit 
rationing, farm size growth, and bank capital adequacy. 
A summary and critique is then presented on the lending 
limit studies and the other applicable literature. 
Legal Statements on 
Lending Limits 
Legal lending limits establish the maximum loan amount 
that a bank can extend to a single borrower. By fixing 
ceilings on the amount of credit an individual borrower 
may receive, beuik regulators can cause banks to spread loams 
eunong a larger number of borrowers than would be the case 
without loam limits. The primary purpose of this loan 
diversification through lending limits is depositor protec­
tion. 
Lending limits differ for state and nationally chartered 
banks. The Comptroller of Currency imposes the limits on 
national banks, while state agencies establish the limits 
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for state banks. Table 2.1 shows the variations in basic 
legal lending limits for banks in Seventh-Federal-Reserve-
District states. For example y Taible 2.1 shows that for 
state chartered banks in Iowa, the legal lending limit is 
20 percent of a bank's common stock, preferred stock, emd 
surplus account. The dollar amount of lending limits is 
found by multiplying the applicable percentage by the 
dollar value of a bank's eligible capital account. The 
applicable percentage and the accounts that can qualify as 
part of a bank's capital base vary with the regulatory 
agency. 
There are exceptions and additions to the basic lending 
limits given in Table 2.1. For example, at national banks, 
loans guaranteed by government agencies such as Farmers 
Home Administration or Federal Housing Administration are 
exempted from lending limits. In terms of additions which 
can be made to the basic lending limits, national banks can 
lend the equivalent of up to a fourth (rather than a tenth) 
of their eligible capital base to a single borrower, pro­
vided the funds are used to buy feeder livestock and the 
livestock securing the loan is worth at least 15 percent more 
than the loan. Similar provisions are available for loans 
on commodities, such as grain, that are secured by warehouse 
receipts. 
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Table 2.1. Variations in Basic Legal Lending Limits for Banks 
in Seventh-Federal-Reserve-District states* 
(Benjamin, 1981, p. 21) 
Applicable 
percentage 
Eligible capital 
accounts 
Nationally chartered banks 10 Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus, subordi­
nated notes and de­
bentures,b undivided 
profits, one-half of 
reserve for loan losses, 
reserve for contingencies 
State chartered bamks 
Illinois 
15 Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus 
Indiana 15 Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus, sub­
ordinated notes and 
debenturesb 
Iowa 20 Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus 
Michigan 20^ Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus, sub­
ordinated notes and 
debentures^ 
Wisconsin 
(the higher of) 
15 Common stock, preferred 
stock, surplus, sub­
ordinated notes and 
debentures" 
or 
20 Common stock, surplus 
*The legal lending limit is equal to the applicable 
percentage times the sum of the dollar value of the eligible 
capital accounts. 
^Subordinated in right of payment to the claims of 
depositors. 
^With the approval of two-thirds of the bank's board of 
directors, otherwise it's 10 percent. 
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Empirical Evidence on 
Lending Limits 
There has been little work on developing and empirically 
testing models that incorporate the effects of lending limits 
on credit allocation in rural areas. Although empirical 
analyses are lacking, some work has been completed which 
brings to light the problems that rural banks have faced 
because of legal lending limits. One study concerning rural 
banking problems in the Seventh Federal Reserve District^ was 
conducted by Gary Benjamin (1980) at the Federal Reserve Bemk 
of Chicago. Another study on rural banking problems in 
Texas was undertaUcen at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
by Don Riffe (1979). 
Benjaumin study 
Benjamin (1980) addresses the problem of legal lending 
limits for banks in the Seventh Federal Reserve District. 
He also considers other problems facing agricultural banks, 
such as liquidity problems. 
Benjamin states that developments during the decade of 
the 1970s support the view that individual legal lending 
limits have increasingly handicapped rural banks in their 
efforts to finamce farmers. He cites a 1978 survey conducted 
^The Seventh Federal Reserve District includes Iowa and 
most of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin. 
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by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago which shows that 
only four percent of the agricultural banks in the Seventh 
Federal Reserve District reported they had fewer customers 
with credit needs in excess of the bank's lending limit 
at years end 1977 than at years end 1972. More them half 
of the agricultural beuiks in the district reported they 
had more farm-loan customers with credit needs exceeding 
the bank's lending limit in 1977 than in 1972. 
Two of the factors which have contributed to this 
credit shortfall are the continuing increase in farm size 
in the 1970s and the rapid growth in farm debt. Those two 
factors led to a much greater concentration of farm debt, 
causing borrowing needs to press against lending limit 
ceilings. 
To show how lending limits have increasingly handicapped 
bankers in financing agricultural loan demand, Benjamin pre­
sents a distribution of agricultural banks in the Seventh 
Federal Reserve District, by legal lending limits, for 
December 1972 and December 1977. This distribution is given 
in Table 2.2. For example, in Iowa, at the end of 1977, 1.9 
percent of the agricultural banks had legal lending limits 
of $25,000 or less. Benjamin points out that despite 
considerable growth in lending limits from 1972 through 
1977, nearly 14 percent of the agricultural banks in the 
district in December 1977 had basic lending limits of 
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$50,000 or less. Over a third of the banks operated ât 
limits from $51,000 to $100,000, while nearly a fourth had 
limits from $100,000 to $150,000. 
Table 2.2 also shows differences among states in lending 
limits. Illinois and Iowa tended to have the lowest lending 
limits in the district, largely because of differences in 
banking structure. More than half the agricultural banks 
in Illinois and over three-fifths in Iowa had lending limits 
of $100,000 or less at the end of 1977, while by contrast, 
only three-tenths of the agricultural banks in Indiana, one-
sixth in Michigan, and two-fifths in Wisconsin had limits 
of $100,000 or less. 
Benjamin then shows how easily the borrowing require­
ments of many farmers in the Midwest could exceed a legal 
lending limit of $100,000. He cites USDA budgets for 1978, 
which showed, for example, that grain farmers in the Midwest 
had variable per acre costs (excluding labor and interest) 
of roughly $36 for soybeans and $82 for corn. For a 500 acre 
farm raising equal amounts of corn and soybeans, that would 
cunount to roughly $30,000 in operating costs that had to be 
financed either by equity or debt. If half the farm was 
cash rented at $100 per acre, another $25,000 would be added 
to current operating costs. 
Purchase of a major item of machinery such as a tractor 
Table 2.2. Distribution of agricultural beuiks in the Seventh Federal Reserve District, by legal 
lending limits, December 1972 and 1977 (Benjamin, 1980, p. 22) 
Percent of banks, by loam limit categories 
Legal lending limit (thousamd dollars) 
25 26 51 76 101 151 201 301 
or to to to to to to to 
less 50 75 100 150 200 30 more 
Illinois 
1972 9.6 42.1 25.7 10.0 7.9 1.8 2.1 0.7 
1977 1,4 17.5 22.9 10.0 28.2 9.3 6.1 4.6 
Indiana 
1972 4.6 27.8 28.7 9.3 17.6 4.6 5.6 1.9 
1977 0.9 6.5 10.2 13.9 29.6 13.0 15.7 11.1 
Iowa 
1972 5.2 40.3 25.0 16.9 9.1 2.3 1.0 0.3 
1977 1.9 13.0 21.4 25.0 17.5 12.0 6.8 2.3 
Michigan 
1972 0.0 8.9 16.5 19.0 27.8 10.1 10.1 7.6 
1977 0.0 0.0 2.5 13.9 24.1 20.3 19.0 20.3 
Wisconsin 
1972 4.6 27.2 21.9 21.2 16.6 7.3 1.3 0.0 
1977 1.3 12.6 12.6 13.9 25.8 15.2 13.9 4.6 
Seventh Federal 
Reserve District 
1972 5.9 34.6 24.4 14.8 12.5 3.9 2.7 1.2 
1977 1.3 12.4 17.5 16.4 24.1 12.5 9.8 5.9 
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or combine could add $50,000 or more in borrowing needs. If 
more lamd were purchased, say 40 acres, then borrowing re­
quirements might increase from $30,000 to $85,000. Numerous 
other expenditures, such as real estate improvements, could 
further boost credit needs well beyond the legal lending 
limits of many agricultural banks. 
Benjamin concludes that rural banks will have to in­
crease their capital base to offset the resulting pressure 
on lending limits. The decline in farm numbers and con­
comitant increase in farm size are expected to continue and 
operating farm debt will very likely continue to be held by 
ever fewer farmers. He notes that these trends may cause 
rural banks to look to branch banking emd multibank holding 
companies as a means of expanding their capital base. 
Riffe study 
The Dallas Fed study by Riffe (1979), examines the 
capacity of rural Texas banks to make large farm loans. 
Riffe points out that the use of loan participation by rural 
Texas banks with other lenders to accommodate borrowers with 
overline loan requests may actually be unprofitable to rural 
banks in periods of tight money, when loan participations 
may be needed most. The compensating balances required 
by correspondents in loan participations may be very costly 
for rural banks in tight monetary conditions. Because loan 
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participations may be especially unprofiteUale to a rural bank 
in periods of tight money, a rural bank's capacity to make 
large loans may become more severely restricted in tight 
money periods than in easy money periods. 
In the early 1970s,the lending capabilities of many 
rural Texas banks were thought to be inadequate to keep pace 
with growing farm credit demands. However, Riffe states that 
an examination of annual changes in meucimum loan limits at 
agriculturally-oriented rural banks since 1970 indicates that 
loam limits have, on average, at least kept pace with in­
creases in farm loan size. But, he states, overall growth 
in credit requirements of individual farmers may have outpaced 
growth in bank loan limits in particular years. 
Riffe analyzes changes in loan limits at agriculturally-
oriented Texas banks by selecting a group of banks with at 
least one-fourth of their loan portfolios in agricultural 
loans. The information was obtained from the December reports 
of condition of each year from 1970 through 1978 for 388 
banks. The seunple includes 211 state banks and 177 national 
banks. 
Results of the loan limit computations are shown in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.3 shows loan limits of selected 
agricultural banks in Texas from 1970 to 1978, inclusive. The 
lower and upper loan limits for national banks refer to the 10 
percent rule for national banks and the important exception 
Table 2.3. Loan limits of selected agricultural banks in Texas, 1970-1978 (Riffe, 1979, p. 2) 
(dollar eunounts in thouswds) 
December 31 
State bêmks National banks a 
Average 
limit 
Percent 
chemge from 
prior 
year 
Average 
lower 
limit 
Average 
upper 
limit 
Percent 
change from 
prior 
year^ 
1970 $ 72.9 - $ 79.4 $198.4 -
1971 78.9 8.0 85.4 214.5 8.1 
1972 87.2 10.0 94.0 234.9 9.6 
1973 101.8 16.7 108.6 271.4 15.5 
1974 117.2 15.1 123.0 307.5 13.3 
1975 127.3 8.6 137.0 342.5 11.4 
1976 141.2 10.9 149.1 372.7 8.8 
1977 162.1 14.8 168.5 421.1 13.0 
1978 181.1 11.7 195.2 488.0 15.9 
^Lower limit calculated as 10 percent of qualifying capital base; upper limit, ais 25 percent, 
b 
May not exactly correspond to changes in both lower emd upper limits because of rounding. 
Table 2.4. Distribution of selected agricultural bemks in Texas, by loan limits, 1970-1978 
(Riffe, 1979, p. 3) 
Percent* of bamks, by loam limit categories 
Under $100,000 $100,000 to $200,000 Over $200,000 
National National National 
banksb banks^ bamks^ 
State Lower Upper State Lower Upper State Lower Upper 
baulks limit limit banks limit limit banks limit limit 
1970 39 35 14 13 9 16 2 2 15 
1971 37 35 12 15 9 15 3 2 18 
1972 36 32 10 15 10 15 3 3 21 
1973 32 27 6 17 14 14 5 5 25 
1974 29 23 5 18 16 13 8 6 28 
1975 24 21 4 21 18 12 9 7 29 
1976 23 20 3 21 16 11 10 10 31 
1977 20 18 2 23 14 11 12 13 32 
1978 17 14 2 22 15 9 15 16 35 
a 
Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding. 
Lower limit calculated as 10 percent of qualifying capital base; upper limit, as 25 percent. 
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where 25 percent may be extended for a livestock loan, 
respectively. State banks may lend up to 25 percent of 
their qualifying capital base, but their qualifying capital 
base is more narrowly defined than that of national banks. 
Between 1970 and 1978, the average loan limit for the 
selected group of banks more than doubled, increasing at an 
average annual rate of 11.9 percent for national banks and 
12.1 percent for state banks. Table 2.3 shows that the 
average loan limit for state banks increased from $162,100 in 
1977 to $181,100 in 1978, an 11.7 percent increase. The 
average upper locui limit for national banks increased from 
$421,100 in 1977 to $488,000 in 1978, a 15.9 percent in­
crease. 
Table 2.4 shows the distribution of selected agri­
cultural banks in Texas, by loan limits, for 1970 to 1978. 
Although the average loan limit more than doubled between 
1970 and 1978, Table 2.4 points out that at least 19 per­
cent of the selected banks could not make a loan above 
$100,000 at the end of 1978. By looking beneath the "under 
$100,000" loan limit category in Table 2.4, it is noted that 
17 percent of the selected banks were state banks which could 
not make a loan above $100,000 at the end of 1978, whereas 
two percent of the sample were national banks which could not 
make a loan for more than $100,000 even with the 25 percent 
allowance for livestock loans. In the $100,000 to $200,000 
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category, 22 percent of the selected banks were state banks, 
whereas 9 percent of the sample were national banks at the 
upper loan limit. By adding up the percentages in the "under 
$100,000" and the $100,000 to $200,000 loan limit categories 
for state banks and national banks at the upper loan limit, 
it is seen that at least half of the selected banks had 
loan limits below $200,000. 
Because direct information on farm loan size or number 
of farm borrowers was not available for commercial banks, 
Riffe used information from another major source of farm 
credit—Production Credit Associations (PCAs). PCAs are 
second only to banks as suppliers of farm credit in Texas. 
On the average, PCA loans tend to be larger than bank loans 
to farmers, but Riffe assumed that year-to-year changes in 
the size of the bank loans were reasonably similar to 
changes occurring at PCAs. Table 2.5 shows loans outstanding 
at PCAs in Texas from 1970 to 1978. 
Riffe notes that the average size of PCA loans to Texas 
farmers increased from $25.1 thousand to $60.6 thousand 
between 1970 and 1978—an average annual rate of aUoout 12.2 
percent. However, annual increases fluctuated greatly, 
ranging from almost zero to nearly 28 percent, indicating that 
the overall growth in farm loan size was actually slow in a 
number of years relative to the growth in bank loan limits. 
On the average, the growth rates of loan size and loan limits 
Table 2.5. Loams outstanding at production credit associations in Texaus, 1970-1978 (Riffe, 1979, 
p. 4) (dollar amounts in thousands) 
Loans over $100,000 
December 31 
Average 
loan 
size 
Percent 
chamge from 
prior 
year 
Percent 
of 
total 
borrowers 
Percent 
of 
total 
loans 
Average 
loan 
size 
1970 $25.1 5.5 a n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1971 32.1 27.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1972 35.5 10.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1973 41.1 15.8 9.3 66.6 $293.9 
1974 44.7 8.8 10.1 63.0 277.7 
1975 45.9 4.1 10.7 63.8 274.1 
1976 50.4 9.8 12.1 65.4 272.5 
1977 50.5 0.2 13.1 65.0 250.1 
1978 60.6 20.0 15.5 69.6 272.1 
*n.a. - not available. 
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were very similar. Riffe points out that relatively large 
loans are the only ones likely to grow enough to exceed a 
bank's loan limit. From the loan limit computations, Riffe 
concludes that farm borrowers with credit needs as low as 
$100,000 are "bumping" loan limits at many rural banks. 
A classification of Texas PCA borrowers by size of loan 
since 1973 shows that the number of borrowers with loans 
of more than $100,000 outstanding increased 50 percent from 
1973 to 1978. 
The PCA data in Table 2.5 indicate that a small pro­
portion of relatively large borrowers account for a large share 
of total agricultural loan dollars at PCAs. At the end of 
1973, for example, those in the group with loans over 
$100,000 represented only 9.3 percent of all Texas PCA 
borrowers but accounted for 66.6 percent of the total PCA 
dollar loan volume. At the end of 1978, this group com­
prised 15.5 percent of all borrowers and accounted for 
69.6 percent of loan volume. Although bank borrowers may 
not be distributed among loan-size categories in the same 
porportions as PCA borrowers, the PCA data likely reflect 
similar trends occurring at rural banks. Thus, Riffe 
states, there appears to be some need for banks to keep 
raising loan limits and/or find more effective methods 
of handling overline loans. 
Riffe concludes that despite the appearance that loan 
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limits were keeping pace with the growth in farm loan size 
in the seventies, it may be increasingly difficult for small 
rural banks to handle the growing number of larger farm 
loams as farm growth and inflation continue to boost farm 
loan size. 
Critique 
The Benjamin and Riffe studies present some statistics 
on lending limits in their respective Federal Reserve 
Districts. Both studies note the possible need to increase 
capital bases at rural banks to keep pace with growing farm 
loan size. But other than presenting and summarizing data 
on lending limits, no rigorous analysis is performed. 
Neither article presents theoretical or empirical work on 
the effects of lending limits on credit allocation to 
farmers. To study the impact of lending limits on credit 
allocation to agriculture, theoretical linkages between 
lending limits and farm size and input costs are necessary. 
Then empirical analyses of those linkages are required. 
Related Topics 
Credit rationing 
Credit rationing is said to occur if the demand for 
loans exceeds the supply of loans at the quoted interest rate. 
That is, banks are either unwilling or unable to supply all 
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of the credit demanded at the stated rate. Because lending 
limits may cause banks to be unable to supply the level of 
credit demanded, lending limits may be the cause of a form 
of credit rationing. 
The subject of credit rationing has received a great 
deal of attention in the literature, but for the most part, 
the focus of this attention has been on credit rationing 
to business firms. To directly measure credit rationing, data 
for both the demand and supply functions of each customer of 
a bank are required. In practice, these data are not avail­
able, and thus indirect measurement of credit rationing has 
been undertaken. The studies which employ indirect measure­
ment of credit rationing can be divided into those that test 
for the existence of credit rationing and those that test 
for evidence of discrimination against small borrowers. In 
this section, some of the major empirical studies on credit 
rationing are briefly examined. No attempt is made to 
present an exhaustive summary of all articles pertaining to 
credit rationing. 
Studies of the existence of credit rationing Studies 
of the existence of credit rationing attempt to determine 
whether or not credit rationing occurs. The data used in 
those studies include time-series data, survey data, and 
proxy measures. 
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Time-series studies estimate demand and supply functions 
for loans over time with explicit allowance for the existence 
of credit rationing. Typically, those studies estimate 
aggregate demand and supply schedules and the extent of 
rationing in disequilibrium markets. Sealey (1979) presents 
an econometric analysis that is representative of such time-
series studies. 
The loan data Sealey uses were obtained from an unpub­
lished series available from the Federal Reserve Board and 
covers the second quarter of 1952 through the third quarter 
of 1977. Sealey's results indicate that loan demand is 
negatively related to the difference between the observed 
loan rate and the Aaa corporate bond rate (a measure of the 
rate on alternative external financing), and positively 
related to the Federal Reserve's index of industrial produc­
tion in the previous period, undistributed corporate 
profits in the previous period (a measure of the volume of 
alternative internal, short-term financing), and a structural 
change dummy variable for the 1973-1975 period. Of particular 
note is the positive relationship between loan demand emd 
undistributed corporate profits. The positive relationship 
indicates that despite undistributed corporate profits serving 
as an alternative source of funds (in which case, loan demand 
and undistributed corporate profits are negatively related), 
institutional constraints imposed by bamks that part of 
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the investment should be financed by profits has caused loan 
demand and undistributed corporate profits to be positively 
related. Loan supply was found to be positively related to 
the difference between the observed loan rate and the 
Treasury-bill rate, total bank deposits, cost per dollar 
of deposits, and the Federal Reserve's index of industrial 
production in the previous period. 
Sealey uses his loan demamd and loan supply functions 
to measure the extent of credit rationing in disequilibrium 
market models. His results indicate that in two-thirds of 
the time periods from the second quarter of 1952 through the 
third quarter of 1977, loan demand exceeded loan supply, 
thus pointing out the existence of credit rationing. 
In survey studies, officers of commercial banks or 
business firms are questioned as to the existence and 
amount of credit rationing. An example of such survey 
studies is the Quarterly Survey of Changes in Beuik Lending 
Practices conducted by the Federal Reserve System since 1964. 
Although the survey does not directly identify excess demand 
for loans, evidence is collected on the severity of various 
lending policies at commercial banks. Harris (1974), in 
analyzing the survey for the time period 1964III to 1970II, 
concluded that noninterest-rate terms of lending were used by 
banks to clear the loan market and thus, such action implied 
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excess demand for loans at the going market rates. 
Another category of survey studies are those that survey 
reactions of business managers to high interest rates and 
credit rationing. One such survey, undertaken jointly by the 
Federal Reserve-M.I.T. econometric model project and Donald­
son, Lufkin and Jenrette, Inc., New York investment bankers, 
was conducted to determine the firms' adjustments to the 
tight money conditions of 1966. Two of the findings of the 
survey were that the smallest firms experienced relatively 
more rationing than larger firms, as would be expected, and 
that the small firms had about as much success as the large 
firms in obtaining bank credit after being rationed at 
one bank. Another survey of the effects of tight money con­
ditions during 1966 was undertaken by the Office of Business 
Economics (OBE) of the Department of Commerce. This survey 
was undertaUcen to study the effects of credit rationing on 
the fixed capital investment of business firms. An evaluation 
of the OBE survey by Crockett, Friend, and Shavell (1967) 
estimated that the monetary tightness in 1966 resulted in a 
reduction in annual fixed capital investment of about $500 
million. Their estimates include not only the effects of 
rationing, but also other monetary conditions such as high 
interest rates and the decline in the stock market, that 
occurred during this period. 
In proxy-measure studies, variables expected to be highly 
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correlated with credit rationing are used as measures of the 
actual phenomenon. Two of the studies employing this ap­
proach are Hand (1968) and Jaffee (1971). Hand develops a 
list of 24 variables which in principle might be highly 
correlated with credit rationing. From these variables, 
which include measures of bank tightness amd characteristics 
of loan customers, he attempts to construct a summary index 
measure as a proxy for the actual amount of credit rationing. 
Hand employs the methods of principal components and 
factor analysis to determine the set of these variables which 
might be taken as indicators of credit rationing. However, 
he runs into problems in trying to identify any resulting 
factors as clearly representing purely credit rationing 
phenomena. These factors could indicate general credit 
tightness and general economic activity, not specifically 
credit rationing. 
Jaffee (1971) also experiences problems in identifying 
an appropriate credit rationing proxy. His study attempts 
to measure the existence and magnitude of credit rationing 
within a fully specified model of the commercial loan market, 
but his results are dependent on the degree to which the proxy 
actually reflects the degree of credit rationing. Although 
the degree of association between the proxy measure and those 
variables thought to be related to rationing is in most 
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cases high, the credit rationing proxy is found to be not 
significantly related to loan demeuid. This lack of sig­
nificance may reflect some inadequacies on the part of 
Jaffee's proxy measure. 
Studies of the existence of discrimination against 
small borrowers Studies of the existence of discrimination 
against small borrowers examine the differential effects of 
tightening monetary conditions on large and small borrowers. 
Most of the studies have employed bank cross-section data 
to analyze bank loan supply functions over periods of dif­
fering monetary tightness for evidence of credit rationing 
in the tight-money periods. The primary source of cross-
section data has been the Federal Reserve's sample surveys 
of commercial and industrial loans made by member banks in 
October 1955 and October 1957. A stratified probability 
Scunple of about 2,000 bgmks which included all banks with 
deposits over $50 million and declining proportions of 
smaller banks was tcJcen. Information collected included such 
variables as the size of the loan, the interest rate, and the 
maturity of loans granted or approved in the month preceding 
the survey. The Federal Reserve data were used in the cross-
section studies of Bach and Huizenga (1961), Hester (1962), 
and Silber and Polakoff (1970). 
Bach and Huizenga (1961) classify banks, for the period 
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October 1955 to October 1957, into three groups: loose, 
redium, and tight. A bank classified as loose had a rela­
tively high ratio of free reserves and government bills 
and certificates to total deposits in October 1955 and a 
high growth in deposits over the period relative to other 
bamks '. 
The hypothesis to be tested held that tight money 
leads to discrimination, that is credit rationing, against 
small firms in the availability of loan funds. Assuming 
the demand for loans remains constant across banks. Bach 
and Huizenga felt that the credit rationing of small firms 
should show up as a relatively slow growth in loans granted 
to small firms at the tight banks compared to the medium 
and loose banks. 
The results of the Bach and Huizenga study indicated 
that loans to large firms increased more rapidly than loans 
to small firms for all categories of banks. The relative 
growth rate of loans to small firms was greatest, however, 
at the tight banks, thus leading Bach and Huizenga to re­
ject the hypothesis of discrimination, or credit rationing, 
against small firms. 
Hester (1962) uses the Federal Reserve survey data in 
his study of commercial bank loan offer functions. He 
examines the effects of tightening monetary conditions 
between 1955 and 1957 on credit rationing by considering 
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several hypotheses. One hypothesis deals with the effects 
of a ceteris paribus increase in interest rates on competing 
assets on borrowers' interest rates on their loans. Other 
hypotheses deal with the existence of credit rationing, 
such as the effect of ceteris paribus increase in interest 
rates on competing assets on the amount of the loan extended 
to a borrower. 
Rather them using the full sample from the Federal 
Reserve survey, Hester uses pooled observations from the 
survey for banks in the Cleveland Federal Reserve district 
to test his hypotheses. Individual loans aure used as the 
unit of observation. Hester's results lead him to accept 
the hypothesis that a ceteris paribus increase in interest 
rates on competing assets increases the interest rate paid 
by borrowers on loans, and to reject all the other hypotheses, 
which are concerned with the existence of credit rationing. 
Silber and Polakoff (1970) base their model on Hester's 
specification of the commercial bank loan offer function, but 
rather than using individual loans as the unit of observa­
tion, the individual bank is used. Another difference from 
the Hester study is that, whereas Hester used data from 
the Cleveland Federal Reserve district, Silber and Polakoff 
use data from the New York Federal Reserve district. Silber 
and Polakoff fit regressions for the supply of loans dis-
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aggregated into five asset size classes for the years 1955 
and 1957. The independent variables include the deposits 
of the bamk, interest rates on loans, maturities of the 
loans, and security requirements on the loans. 
Silber and Polakoff base their test for discrimination 
on the ratio of the deposit variable coefficients between 
1955 and 1957 for each of the asset categories. They 
hypothesize that if discrimination against small firms 
occurred between 1955 and 1957, then the ratio of the 1955 
to the 1957 deposit variable coefficient should decline for 
larger asset size classes. The results of their test indicate 
that, except for the smallest asset class (assets less than 
one-quarter million dollars), the ratio of deposit coeffi­
cients does decline for larger asset classes. Furthermore, 
the ratio of deposit coefficients declines somewhat dramatical­
ly at the middle asset size class (assets $1 to $5 million). 
Thus, Silber and PolaUcoff conclude that discrimination 
against small firms does occur, particularly against those 
firms with assets of $5 million or less. 
Farm size growth 
Another topic related to lending limit problems and 
credit allocation to agriculture is that of farm size growth 
and the increased need for farm capital and credit. As noted 
earlier, the increase in farm credit requirements brought 
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about, among other things, by farm size growth, has not been 
met by increases in dollar lending limits. A report by the 
American Bankers Association (1973) on the ability of indi­
vidual rural banks to finance farmers found that, although 
rural banks should be able to meet farm loan demand in the 
aggregate in the future, the capital resources of the 
average-sized rural bemk are not growing fast enough to keep 
pace with farm loan demand on an individual level. This 
situation, they note, has occurred with increasing frequency 
as the size of farm units has increased. 
Melichar (1973) points out another problem—that of 
increased debt expansion on a per-farm basis. The increased 
use of debt, rather than internal financing, by the farming 
sector has placed an added burden on the ability of rural 
banks to service their farm loeui customers. Because nearly 
all rural banks are small, this debt-financing problem is not 
easily solvable. Furthermore, smaller banks play an im­
portant role in financing agriculture, supplying a major 
share of total bank lending to agriculture. A study by 
Hamblin (1975) states that in 1974, small banks in the U.S. 
(banks with less than $25 million in deposits) held 55 per­
cent of the agricultural loans held by all banks. 
Some studies have attempted to measure the impact of farm 
size growth on the credit requirements for agriculture. One 
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study by Harris and Nehring (1976) measures the impact of 
farm size on the bidding potential for agricultural land. 
Other studies, such as Boehlje and White (1969), view farm 
firm growth not in a size context, but in changes in net 
worth and disposable income, looking at the investment and 
production decisions the farm firm makes in the growth 
process. Whether growth is measured as an increase in the 
size of the farm firm or as an increase in net worth, an 
increased need for farm credit results. This makes it po­
tentially difficult for rural banks to service their farm 
loan customers. 
Bank capital adequacy 
A third topic related to lending limits and credit alloca­
tion to agriculture is bank capital adequacy. With a fixed 
percentage lending limit, bank capital must grow in order 
for dollar lending limits to increase. But concerns about 
bank capital adequacy over the past fifteen years have raised 
doubts as to whether the growth of bank capital is sufficient 
to meet increased loem demand. Factors such as bank failures, 
declining capital-to-asset ratios, and decreasing profitability 
levels have heightened interest in the bank capital adequacy 
issue. 
Most empirical studies, such as Cotter (1966) and Vojta 
(1973), on the topic of bank capital adequacy are concerned 
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with the relationship between capital positions and bank 
failure. Although no significant relationship has been found 
between bank capital positions and bank failure, bank regu­
lators feel that bank capital positions are an important in­
put in determining the soundness, or safety, of the banking 
system. 
In order to determine an "adequate" aunount of capital 
for a bank, bank regulators employ capital adequacy formulas. 
Capital adequacy formulas attempt to assign specific weights 
to various portfolio factors to generate a dollar amount of 
adequate capital. These formulas are designed to estimate 
adequate capital for the typical bank and are to be used as 
guidelines for the bank examiner. 
One of these formulas is that based on adjusted risk-
assets, that is, total assets minus all assets with no 
default risk—basically cash, U.S. government securities, and 
loans guaranteed by agencies of the federal government. The 
excess of loan valuation reserves over estimated loan losses 
is then added to adjusted risk-assets. Adequate capital 
equals one-sixth of the resulting sum. 
Another formula is that developed by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. This formula takes account of the 
different money-market risks of default-free assets by 
assessing different capital requirements against different 
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portfolio items. For exêunple, no capital is required against 
cash and short-term (under five years) governments, and five 
percent is needed against long-term government and other 
"minimum risk assets" (for example, guaranteed loans and 
mortgages, and money-market loans). The ratio of these 
capital requirements to "good" capital—that is, total 
capital, including valuation reserves, less losses—is then 
formed. A ratio of 1.0 is considered a minimum requirement 
in that all other circumstances must be exceptionally favorable 
for a bank to be permitted so little capital. A more "ade­
quate" ratio would be 1.25. 
A third formula is that used by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. It is similar to the formula 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in that it assigns 
variable weights to the portfolio items, but it attempts, in 
addition, to quantify other factors, such as bank size, trust 
operations, and liquidity, which might otherwise be left to 
the examiner's judgment. One of the quantifications of 
these other factors is that of a requirement of $40,000 (in 
bank capital) per loam portfolio (somewhat scaled down for 
portfolios under $500,000), which is designed to force 
small beuiks, with their more concentrated risks, to have 
higher capital-deposit ratios. 
These attempts by bank regulators to determine an 
"adequate" amount of bank capital have been met with skepticism 
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as to their effectiveness. Several studies, including 
Peltzman (1970) and Mayne (1972), have shown that regulatory 
guidelines regarding capital adequacy are largely ignored by 
banks. Other studies such as Kreps and Wacht (1971) and 
Mingo (1975) show that bankers treat deposit insurance as a 
substitute for bank capital. Still other studies, such as 
Pringle (1974) and Santomero and Watson (1977) suggest that 
an "optimal" capital position, rather than an "adequate" 
capital position that's arbitrary, should be determined. 
Despite all the discussion and debate on bank capital 
adequacy, the lending limit problem appears to be more severe 
than the bank capital adequacy issue, as the Chicago and 
Dallas Federal Reserve studies discussed earlier point out. A 
bank may be able to maintain an "adequate" amount of bank 
capital to satisfy bank regulators, and still not be able to 
meet its loan demand because of lending limits, which are tied 
to bank capital. This problem of solving capital needs is 
even more severe for smaller banks than for larger banks, as 
Chaps (1975) points out. Chaps states that the external 
funding mechanisms that are available to the large banks have 
little or no applicability to the small banks. Furthermore, 
he states that retained earnings, the most important source 
of bêuik capital, won't supply the need for new capital to 
small bemks in the future. Because it is estimated that 
banks will be able to generate only about 50 percent of their 
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capital requirements internally, Chaps asserts that banks 
are going to be faced with the need for external financing 
if they are to continue to grow. 
Summary and critique of related topics 
The topics of credit rationing, farm size growth, emd 
bêmk capital adequacy are all related to lending limits emd 
credit availability to agricultural borrowers. The credit 
rationing literature attempts to determine the existence and 
amount of credit rationing or the existence of discrimi 
tioh against small borrowers. Lending limits may lead to 
credit rationing, but that rationing, her use of limits on 
the amount of credit a bank can extend to an individual 
borrower, deals with rationing of large borrowers. 
Furthermore, the credit rationing studies, though 
presenting the differential impacts of credit rationing on 
large and small firms, are concerned with business firms, 
not farm firms. Although there are similarities between 
business and farm firms, differences, such as the credit 
system for agriculture, exist between them which cause 
analyses of the two to differ. More importantly, however, 
the key distinction between the literature on credit rationing 
and the lending limit problem is that credit rationing studies 
do not investigate the source of excess demand for loans. 
Credit rationing studies deal with whether or not excess loan 
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demand exists. A more fundamental question is asked in the 
study of lending limits—if excess demand for loans exists, 
as is indicated by 50 percent of the banks in the Chicago 
Federal Reserve survey, to what extent is that excess demand 
caused by lending limits in conjunction with other factors? 
Similarly, the topic of farm size growth is related 
to lending limits. Farm credit requirements are an important 
consideration for studies in farm size growth. Studies on 
lending limits must also examine farm credit requirements. 
But, whereas studies of farm size growth and farm credit re­
quirements are concerned with loan demand, the topic of 
lending limits is concerned with both loan demand amd loan 
supply. 
Bank capital adequacy is also related to the topic of 
lending limits. The bank capital adequacy issue looks at 
the problem of maintaining a "safe" eunount of bank capital 
with which to insure soundness of the banking system amd 
safety for depositors. The lending limit problem also con­
cerns itself with an "adequate" amount of bank capital, but 
in this case, "adeqate" means sufficient to satisfy a bank's 
loan customers. 
Thus, the topics of credit rationing, farm size growth, 
and bank capital adequacy are related to the lending limit 
problem, but do not explicitly consider it. Although each 
of the related topics contributes towards an understanding of 
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the lending limit problem, a direct analysis of lending 
limits is required to study its impact on credit availability 
to agricultural borrowers. 
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CHAPTER III. A THEORETICAL EXAMINATION OF 
LENDING LIMITS 
In the review of the literature on lending limits, it 
was noted that little theoretical work has been done to 
determine the impact of lending limits on availability of 
credit to agricultural borrowers. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present a graphical and mathematical analysis 
of the effects of lending limits on an individual bank's 
ability to satisfy its loan customers. A graphical analysis 
is given in the next section, with a simple mathematical 
model developed and analyzed in the following section. 
A Graphical Analysis of the Effects 
of Lending Limits 
A graphical analysis of the effects of lending limits 
on the loan market is presented under the situations of 
flexible, fixed, and sticky interest rates. The discussion 
begins with the case of flexible interest rates and no 
lending limits. Next, the situation of flexible interest 
rates and lending limits is developed. Then, the cases of 
fixed interest rates with amd without lending limits are 
given. Finally, the situations of sticky interest rates 
with and without lending limits are presented. 
Throughout this discussion, it is assumed that there 
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are m identical banks operating in a banking market and each 
bank has n identical customers. Market demand is thus the 
summation of individual customer demands at the m identical 
banks. 
Flexible interest rates and no lending limits 
In the presence of flexible interest rates amd in the 
absence of lending limits, the loan market attains equilibrium. 
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, equilibrium initially occurs where 
D S the loan demand (LQ) and loan supply (LQ) curves intersect. 
The term r^ is the equilibrium interest rate of the bank and 
LQ is the equilibrium loan amount. 
Suppose an increase in loan demand occurs, causing 
the loan demand curve to shift from LQ to L^. In this situa­
tion in the absence of lending limits, no excess loan demand 
occurs because interest rates adjust to clear the market. 
The new equilibrium interest rate is r^^ and L^ is the new 
equilibrium loan amount. Both values are greater than initial 
equilibrium levels. 
Flexible interest rates emd lending limits with the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve above tKe 
kink in the loan supply curve 
With the inclusion of lending limits, the market loan supply 
curve becomes kinked. The maximum that can be loaned by all 
banks in the market will be the product of the individual 
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Loan Amount 
Figure 3.1. Credit availability under flexible interest 
rates with no lending limits 
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customer lending limits times the number of customers times 
the number of banks in the market. Beyond the kink, loan 
supply is perfectly inelastic with respect to interest rates. 
With flexible interest rates, however, equilibrium can be 
attained, as Figure 3.2 indicates. 
Because of the imposition of lending limits, the loan sup-
C C 
ply curve is rather than LQ, as shown in Figure 3.2. The 
maximum amount that all banks Ccui lend is denoted by L^. With 
flexible interest rates and the loan demand curve (LQ) inter-
C 
secting the lending limit supply curve (L^) above its kink, 
equilibrium is attained at higher interest rates (r^ > r^) 
and a lower loan amount (L^ < LQ) than in the absence of 
lending limits. In the present case of the loan demand curve 
intersecting the loan supply curve above its kink, loan demand 
determines interest rates but has no effect on loan amount, 
which is fixed by regulation. 
Suppose loan demand increases, causing the loan demand 
curve to shift from Lg to . If the loan supply curve re-
g 
mains at L^, then interest rates rise from r^ to r^^ with no 
change in the loan amount. Similarly, with the loan demand 
curve LQ, for a decrease in loan supply which results in a 
e c 
leftward shift in the loan supply curve from L^ to L^,, 
interest rates tise from r^ to r^,. However, the maximum 
loan amount decreases from L^ to L, because of the decrease 
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Figure 3.2. Credit availability under flexible interest 
rates and lending limits with the loam demand 
curve intersecting the loan supply curve above 
the kink in the loan supply curve 
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in loan supply. The point of this discussion, whether loan 
supply or loan demand shifts, is that equilibrium can be 
attained despite the scenario of lending limits if interest 
rates are flexible. But, in the absence of lending limits, 
interest rates are lower and the loan amount higher than in 
the situation where lending limits exist. 
Flexible interest rates and lending limits with the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve below the 
kink in the loan supply curve 
If the loan demand curve intersects the loan supply 
curve below the kink in the loan supply curve, as shown in 
Figure 3.3, lending limits create no problems. In this 
situation, the equilibrium loan amount is less than the 
mcucimum amount banks can lend. Also, as shown in Figure 
3.3, interest rates are both demand and supply determined, 
not only demand determined as in Figure 3.2. 
c 
Initially, with loan supply curve and loan demand 
curve Lg, equilibrium is attained at the rg level of interest 
rates and loan amount Lg. As in the previous cases, suppose 
a rightward shift in the loan dememd curve occurs from Lg to 
with no change in the loan supply curve. Then, both the 
equilibrium level of interest rates and the equilibrium 
loan aunount rise to r^ and L^, respectively. In this situation, 
unlike the case presented in Figure 3.2, the shift in the 
loan demand curve causes a rise in the loan êunount as well as 
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Figure 3.3. Credit availability under flexible interest 
rates and lending limits with the loan demand 
curve intersecting the loan supply curve below 
the kink in the loan supply curve 
47 
a rise in interest rates. Lending limits are not a 
constraint in this case. 
Similarly, for a leftward shift in the loan supply 
S S D 
curve from to L^, and the loan demand curve at LQ, lending 
limits do not constrain the attainment of equilibrium in the 
loan market. The equilibrium interest rate rises from 
rQ to rg while the equilibrium loam amount falls from LQ to 
L2. 
Fixed interest rates and no lending limits 
Turning now to fixed interest rates, the possibility 
of disequilibrium in the loan market occurs. With interest 
rates fixed exogenously, no adjustments toward equilibrium 
are possible. The only way for equilibrium to be attained 
in the loan market under fixed interest rates is if interest 
rates are set such that the loan market clears. 
In Figure 3.4, three possible interest rates are con­
sidered: rQ, rg, and r^. With loan demand curve Lq and loan 
C 
supply curve Lq, if interest rates are established at the rQ 
level, then excess demand of Lg-L^ occurs. Because interest 
rates are fixed, if no other adjustments in the market take 
place, then permanent credit rationing of the amount LQ-L^ 
occurs. If it just so happens that interest rates are set 
at rg, then equilibrium in the loan market occurs. Finally, 
if rates are set at the r^ level, then excess supply of 
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Figure 3.4. Credit availability under fixed interest rates 
with no lending limits 
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LQ-LJ^ exists. 
Now, suppose rates are fixed at r^. With loan supply 
curve LQ, a shift in the loan demand curve LQ to L^ causes 
excess demand to increase to L2-L^. Similarly, with loan de­
mand curve LQ, for a decrease in loan supply which causes the 
S s loan supply curve to shift from LQ to L^, excess demand in­
creases to Lg-Lg. In either case, whether the loan demand curve 
shifted outward or the loan supply curve shifted inward, 
equilibrium is not attained because of fixed interest rates. 
Fixed interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
set below the kink in the loan supply curve and the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve above the 
kink in the loam supply curve 
In the situation of fixed interest rates with lending 
limits, a greater excess loan demand may occur than in cases 
without lending limits. As shown in Figure 3.5, interest 
rates are fixed (at r) below the kink in the loan supply 
curve whereas the loam demand curve intersects the loan 
supply curve above its kink. 
g 
Assume initially that the loan supply curve is Lj^ and 
the loan demand curve is LQ. With interest rates set below 
the kink in the loan supply curve, the loan amount supplied 
is less than the maximum allowed under lending limits. 
Excess loan demand is of the amount LQ-L^. With no chamge 
in loan supply, suppose loan demand increases, causing the 
loan demand curve to shift from LQ to L^. Then, excess loan 
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Figure 3.5. Credit availability under fixed interest rates 
and lending limits with interest rates set below 
the kink in the loan supply curve and the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve 
above the kink in the loan supply curve 
51 
demamd increases to Lg-L^. Excess loan demand would also 
increase for the case of a leftward shift in the loan supply 
curve with loan demand curve LQ. 
Fixed interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
set below the kink in the loan supply curve and the loan demand 
curve intersecting the loan supply curve below the kink in the 
loem supply curve 
With interest rates fixed and the loan demand curve 
intersecting the loan supply curve below the kink in the 
loan supply curve, the remote possibility of equilibrium 
occurs. As illustrated in Figure 3.6, this possibility 
occurs with loan demand curve , which intersects the loan 
supply curve at the r level of fixed interest rates. 
Suppose initially the loan demand curve is LQ. With 
interest rates fixed at the r level, excess loan demand of 
Lg-Lg exists. If loan demand increases, shifting the loan 
demand curve rightward to L^, then with no other chamges 
occurring, excess loan demand increases to L^-Lg. If loan 
demand decreased so that was the relevant loan demand 
curve, then equilibrium would by chance exist despite the 
presence of fixed interest rates and lending limits. 
52 
-t-
Loan Amount 
Credit availability under fixed interest rates 
and lending limits with interest rates set below 
the kink in the loan supply curve and the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve 
below the kink in the loan supply curve 
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Fixed interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
set, and the loan demand curve intersecting the loan supply 
curve, at the kink in the loan supply curve 
Another possible way to attain equilibrium under fixed 
interest rates and lending limits occurs when both the loan 
demand curve and the level of fixed interest rates, by 
chance, intersect the loan supply curve at the kink in the 
loan supply curve. This situation is shown in Figure 3.7, 
with r and the equilibrium level of interest rates and 
equilibrium loan amount, respectively. The loan amount 
is also the maximum which can be lent under lending limits. 
Fixed interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
set above the kink in the loan supply curve and the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve above tEe 
kink in the loan supply curve 
It is also possible to attain equilibrium if both the loan 
demand curve and fixed interest rates intersect the loan sup­
ply curve above the kink in the loan supply curve. As 
Figure 3.8 illustrates, equilibrium can occur by chance with 
loan demand curve Lg and fixed interest rate, r. 
Suppose initially the loan demand curve is LQ in 
Figure 3.8. Then, excess loan demand of Lg-L^ exists. If a 
ceteris paribus increase in loan demand occurs, then the loan 
demamd curve shifts rightward from LQ to L^. Excess loan de­
mand also increases, from to L^-L^. If loan demand de­
creased so that Lg was the relevant loan demand curve, then. 
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Figure 3.7. 
Loan Amount 
Credit availability under fixed interest rates 
and lending limits with both the loan demand 
curve and the fixed level of interest rates 
intersecting the loam supply curve at the kink 
in the loan supply curve 
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Credit availability under fixed interest rates 
and lending limits with interest rates set above 
the kink in the loem supply curve and the loan 
demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve 
above the kink in the loan supply curve 
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as discussed in the preceding paragraph, equilibrium would 
exist. For further leftward shifts in the loan demand curve 
(to the left of but intersecting the loan supply curve 
above its kink), excess loan supply exists. 
Fixed interest rates and lending limits with interest 
rates set ^ove the kink in the loan supply curve and the 
loan demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve below 
the kink in the loan supply curve 
In the case of the loan demand curve intersecting the 
loan supply curve below its kink and interest rates fixed 
eUsove the kink in the loan supply curve, excess loan supply 
occurs. For instance, as in Figure 3.9, if the loan demand 
curve is L^, then excess loan supply of L^-Lg exists. For 
a rightward shift in the loan demand curve from LQ to 
caused by an increase in loan demand, excess loan supply 
still exists but decreases to L^-L^. 
Sticky interest rates 
The situations in which sticky interest rates occur 
represent intermediate cases between those of flexible and 
fixed interest rates. Initially, interest rates are set as 
in the cases of fixed interest rates, but unless the rates 
are established such that equilibrium prevails, the rates, 
over time, can adjust so that equilibrium is attained, as 
in the cases of flexible interest rates. However, under 
sticky interest rates, the process of reaching equilibrium 
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Figure 3.8. Credit availability under fixed interst rates and 
lending limits with interest rates set above the 
kink in the loam supply curve cmd the loan demand 
curve intersecting the loan supply curve below the 
kink in the loan supply curve 
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takes longer than under flexible interest rates because of a 
slower adjustment process. As under fixed interest rates, 
institutional factors may be the cause of this restricted ad­
justment toward equilibrium, or "temporary" credit rationing. 
Following along the lines of the discussion of flexible and 
fixed interest rates, sticky interest rates will be examined 
both with and without lending limits. 
Sticky interest rates and no lending limits 
As in the case of fixed interest rates without lending 
limits, the scenario of sticky interest rates without lending 
limits may cause excess loan demand to occur. But, unlike 
the fixed-interest-rates case, the excess loan demand is not 
permanent. Given sufficient time for adjustment, equilibrium 
can be attained under sticky interest rates. 
Assume, as shown in Figure 3.10, that interest rates 
are initially established at the r^ level. Then, excess loan 
demand of Lg-L^ occurs. But, because interest rates are 
"sticky" as opposed to fixed, adjustments in the rates are 
possible. The first adjustment in interest rates might set 
the rates at rg. Assuming no shifts in the loan demand and 
loan supply curves, excess loan demand then decreases to 
Similar adjustments in interest rates lead to further 
declines in excess loan demamd until equilibrium is reached 
with rp and L_, the equilibrium, level of interest rates and 
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Loan Amount 
Figure 3.10. Credit availability under sticky interest 
rates with no lending limits 
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loan amount, respectively. Thus, temporary excess loan de­
mand exists until interest rates adjust to clear the 
market. Through the adjustments in interest rates, the eunount 
rationed decreases over time and is thus temporary. 
Sticky interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set below the kink in the loan supply curve and 
the loan demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve 
above the kink in the loan supply curve 
As in the situation of sticky interest rates amd no 
lending limits, the case of sticky interest rates and 
lending limits permits excess loem demand to decrease over 
time. As shown in Figure 3.11, suppose initially that 
interest rates are set at the r^ level. Then, excess loan 
demand of the amount Lg-L^ exists. As interest rates adjust 
to clear the market, intermediate rates such as rg may occur, 
in which case excess loan demand decreases to Lg-L^. Be-
cuase excess loan demand still exists at rg, interest rates 
continue to rise, eventually reaching r^ where equilibrium 
is attained. The equilibrium loan amount is L^, the maximum 
loan amount allowed by lending limits. 
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Figure 3.11, 
Loan Amount 
Credit availability under sticky interest 
rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set below the kink in the loan supply 
curve and the loan demand curve intersecting 
the loam supply curve above the kink in the 
loam supply curve 
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Sticky interest rates and lending limits with Interest rates 
initially set below the kink in the loan supply curve and the 
loan demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve below 
the kink in the loan supply curve 
In the case of the loan demand curve and the level of 
interest rates intersecting the loan supply curve below the 
kink in the loan supply curve, excess loan demand may again 
occur. This situation is depicted graphically in Figure 3.12. 
Assume initially that interest rates are fixed at r^. Then, 
an excess loan demand of Lg-L^ exists. After a time, interest 
rates may rise to r^ y causing excess loan dememd to decrease 
to Lg-Lg. Further adjustments in interest rates eventually 
lead to equilibrium at interest rate level r^ and loan amount 
Lg. Note that lending limits have not interfered with the 
attainment of equilibrium in this case because the loan 
demand and loan supply curves intersect at a loan amount 
below the maximum amount, L^, allowed by lending limits. 
Sticky interest rates and lending limits with interest 
rates" initially set aUaove the kink in the loan supply curve 
and the loan demand^ curve intersecting the loan supply 
curve above the kink in the loan supply curve 
Unlike the previous two graphs in which interest rates 
were initially set below the kink in the loan supply curve. 
Figure 3.13 shows interest rates initially set above the 
g 
kink in the loam supply curve L^. Assuming that the interest 
rates are set at r^, excess loan demand is L^-L^. Because 
of the excess loan demand at r^, the sticky interest rates 
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Figure 3.12. 
Loan Amount 
Credit availability under sticky interest 
rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set below the kink in the loan supply 
curve and the loan demand curve intersecting 
the loan supply curve below the kink in the 
loan supply curve 
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Figure 3.13, 
Loan Amount 
Credit availability under sticky interest 
rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set above the kink in the loan 
supply curve and the loan demand curve inter­
secting the loan supply curve above the kink in 
the loan supply curve 
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rise, perhaps to r^. At rg, however, excess loan demand still 
exists, but of a smaller amount, Lg-L^, than at r^. Eventual­
ly, interest rates adjust to r^ at the intersection of the 
loan demand and loan supply curves with the equilibrium 
loan amount. This loan amount is also the maximum aunount 
allowed by lending limits. 
Sticky interest rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set above the kink in Ûie loan supply curve and 
the loan demand curve intersecting the loan supply curve below 
the kink in the loan supply curve 
With interest rates initially set above the kink in the 
loan supply curve and the loan demand curve intersecting the 
loan supply curve below the kink in the loan supply curve, 
excess loan supply exists as shown in Figure 3.14. Assume 
initially that interest rates are set at r^^. Then, excess 
loan supply of L^-L^ exists. Because of the excess loan 
supply, a decline in interest rates occurs to, for instance, 
r^. At r^, excess loan supply decreases to L^-Lg. Eventually, 
interest rates fall to r^, where the adjustment to equilibrium 
is complete. The equilibrium loan amount is L^, which is less 
than the maximum loan eunount allowed by lending limits, L^. 
Summary 
A graphical analysis of the effects of lending limits 
under flexible, fixed, and sticky interest rates was pre­
sented. It was shown that the existence of lending limits 
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Credit availability under sticky interest 
rates and lending limits with interest rates 
initially set above the kink in the loan supply 
curve emd the loan demand curve intersecting 
the loan supply curve below the kink in the 
locui supply curve 
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causes the loan supply curve to kink at the point where the 
maximum loan amount allowed by law is attained. Whether the 
loan demand curve intersects the loan supply curve above 
or below its kink determines the existence of excess loan 
demand. 
The amount and persistence of excess loan demand were 
shown to depend on whether the interest rates were flexible, 
fixed, or sticky. For flexible interest rates, no excess 
loem demêuid exists because rates are allowed to adjust to 
clear the market regardless of the presence of lending limits. 
If fixed interest rates are present, then excess loan demand 
may exist. Further, the excess loan demand will persist un­
less changes in the interest rates, loan supply, or loan 
demand functions occur. If no changes in the variables 
occur, then excess demand will have to be accommodated 
through external sources such as correspondent loans. "Per­
manent" credit rationing occurs if no market variables change 
and external sources of credit are not available. 
In the case of sticky interest rates, excess loan demand 
may occur, but the credit rationing is temporary. Interest 
rates are allowed to adjust over time so that the excess loan 
demand is eliminated. How quickly equilibrium is attained 
depends upon the speed of adjustment of interest rates. 
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A Mathematical Model of the Effects 
of Lending Limits 
Although graphical analysis allows an examination of 
the impacts on equilibrium values of shifts in loan demand 
or loan supply, no explicit insight is given as to why the 
loan demand or loan supply functions might shift. No 
specific exogenous variables are linked to the ultimate 
changes in equilibrium interest rate and loam size vari­
ables. 
In this section, a mathematical model is developed to 
establish the linkages between legal lending limits and other 
variables and the availability of credit to agricultural 
borrowers. The model consists of an aggregate loan demand 
equation and an aggregate loan supply equation for a: _ 
rural banking market. An excess loam demand equation is 
derived and the comparative statics of the model are analyzed. 
The mathematical analysis is confined to those cases in which 
loan supply is perfectly inelastic as a result of legal 
lending limits. That is, it is assumed that the loan demand 
curve intersects the loam supply curve above the kink. Also, 
only the cases involving flexible amd fixed interest rates 
are examined. The situations involving sticky interest rates 
require a dynaunic analysis and are beyond the scope of this 
study. 
A simple market loan demand equation is employed, where 
69 
loan demêmd is a decreasing function of the average of 
interest rates on farm loans charged by banks in the market: 
L? = e - Br; e, B > 0 (3.1) 
where : 
= dollar quantity of agricultural loans demanded in 
the rural banking market, 
e = intercept term, and 
r = average of interest rates on farm loans. 
The intercept term is assumed to include the effects of 
such factors as farm input prices and prices received for farm 
products. As such, "e" is a shift parameter accounting for 
parallel shifts in agricultural loan demand caused by changes 
in (among other factors) prices paid and prices received by 
the farm sector. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the 
rural banks' customers are identical in farm size so that 
individual loan demamds are identical. 
In this model, because loan supply in the market 
is assumed to be pressing up against the lending-limit ceiling, 
loan supply is no longer a function of an interest rate term. 
With this assumption, loan supply is: 
L® = mn l^K (3.2) 
where : 
S L > dollar quantity of agricultural loans supplied in 
the rural banking market, 
m - number of banks in the market. 
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n > number of farm customers serviced by each bank, 
1^= percentage legal lending limit, and 
K = individual bank's eligible capital account. 
Note that the term l^K represents the maucimum loan sup­
ply to an individual borrower at a particular bank. Aggre­
gate loan supply is then m, the number of banks, multi­
plied by n, the number of farm customers, multiplied by l^K, 
the maximum.. 
It is further assumed that the total farm acreage in the 
rural banking market is constant over time euid can be 
expressed as: 
A = mna (3.3) 
where : 
Â = total farm acreage in the rural banking market, 
and 
a = average farm size in the rural banking market. 
Solving (3.3) for mn, and substituting in (3.2) 
yields : 
L® . I l^K. (3.4) 
Equation (3.4) represents the mêucimum loan supply in 
the banking market under lending limits. 
The excess loan demêmd equation in this simple model 
can be formulated by subtracting (3.4) from (3.1): 
X » L°-L^ = e - Br - I l^K (3.5) 
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where : 
X = excess loan demand. 
In Equation (3.5), the variables e, a, and K are exo­
genous, while r and X are endogenous. To ascertain the 
effects of changes in the variables on excess loan demand in 
Equation (3.5), the total differential of (3.5) is taken: 
Â Â dX = de - Bdr + ^  IK da - ^  1 dK. (3.6) A O D O 
Equation (3.6) can be examined under the cases of 
flexible and fixed interest rates. The situation of equi­
librium under flexible interest rates is undertaken first. 
Then, the case of equilibrium under fixed interest rates is 
discussed. Finally, the situation of disequilibrium 
under fixed interest rates is presented. 
Equilibrium under flexible interest rates 
In the case of flexible interest fates, it is assumed 
that dr ^ 0. Interest rates can adjust to exogenous shocks 
to preserve equilibrium and cause dX = 0. Thus, with flexible 
interest rates, 
de - Bdr + ^  IK da - - 1 dK » 0. (3.7) 
a a o 
It is possible to look at the effects of changes in e, 
a, and K on r. Assume first that da = 0 and dK = 0 in Equa­
tion (3.7) to analyze the effect of a change in e on r. 
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This yields: 
^ = I > 0. (3.8) 
Thus a ceteris paribus increase (decrease) in the shift 
parëuneter, e, due to say an increase (decrease) in farm 
input prices, raises (lowers) the loan rate term, r. As farm 
input prices rise (fall), loan demand increases (decreases). 
With loan supply remaining constant, and loan demand in­
creasing (decreasing), the loan rate term increases (de­
creases). This is the case shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, 
where the loan demand curve shifts with no change in the 
loan supply curve. 
Similarly, by letting de = 0 and dK = 0, it is possible 
to determine the effect of a change in a on r. This yields: 
Â IK 
^  = - ^ > 0 .  ( 3 . 9 )  
a o 
Equation (3.9) states that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in average farm size, a, increases (decreases) 
the loan rate term, r. As the average farm size increases 
(decreases), the number of farm customers decreases (in­
creases) and thus loan supply decreases (increases). With 
loam demand remaining constant and loan supply decreasing 
(increasing), the loan rate term increases (decreases). 
This is the situation depicted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, where 
the loan supply curve shifts with no change in the loan demand 
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curve. 
Finally, letting de = 0 and da = 0, the effect of a 
change in K on r can be analyzed. This result is: 
At Â 1 
(3.10) 
Equation (3.10) shows that an inverse relationship 
exists between K and r; that is, a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in a bank's eligible capital account, K, lowers 
(raises) the loan rate term, r. This result occurs because 
loan supply increases (decreases) as a bank's eligible 
capital account increases (decreases). With loan demand 
unchanged, an increase (decrease) in loan supply causes a 
decrease (increase) in the loan rate term. This also is 
the case shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, where the loan 
supply curve shifts while the loan demand curve is un­
changed . 
Equilibrium under fixed interest rates 
Because of institutional constraints, interest rates 
may be fixed. This requires setting dr = 0 in Equation 
(3.7). It is possible that equilibrium can be attained in a 
fixed-rate scheme, that is, dX = 0. The effects of changes 
in e, a, and K can then be investigated to determine 
equilibrium conditions under fixed interest rates. Assume 
first that dK = 0, so that the changes in e and a can be 
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analyzed. This yields: 
da » - de. (3.11) 
A IK 
o 
Because all the variables in the fixed-interest-rate 
case are exogenous, the equations in this section are in 
differential form. Derivatives are not used because a 
change in one exogenous variable does not cause a cheuige 
in êuiother exogenous variable. 
Equation (3.11) stated that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in e,due to say, an increase (decrease) in farm 
input prices must be accompanied by a proportional decrease 
(increase) in average farm size, a, for excess loan demand 
to be satisfied. By what factor a must chamge in order to 
offset a change in e depends upon the value of the coeffi­
cient of de. If farm input prices increase (decrease) causing 
loan demcuid to increase (decrease), then with interest rates 
and a bank's eligible capital account fixed, the only way for 
excess loan demand to be eliminated in the model is through 
a decrease (increase) in average farm size. With legal 
lending limits, a decrease (increase) in average farm size 
causes loan supply to increase (decrease) by increasing 
(decreasing) the number of farm customers. With interest 
rates fixed, an increase (decrease) in loan demand must be 
exactly offset by an increase (decrease) in loan supply for 
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excess loan demand to be satisfied. In the present case, 
where only a and e are allowed to change, this means that a 
must change in proportion to e as set out in Equation 
(3.11). Graphically, in terms of Figures 3.6 and 3.8, the 
increase (decrease) in e causes the loan demand curve to 
shift rightward (leftward). In order to compensate for this 
rightward (leftward) shift in the loan demand curve, a de­
creases (increases), causing the loan supply curve to shift 
rightward (leftward). 
Assume next that da = 0, so that an analysis of 
changes in e and K ceui be made. This result is: 
dK = — de . (3.12) 
A lo 
Equation (3.12) says that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in e must be accompanied by a proportional in­
crease (decrease) in a bank's eligible capital account, K, 
in order for excess loan dememd to be satisfied. The size 
of the coefficient of de determines by what factor K must 
change in order to offset a change in e. With fixed 
interest rates and fixed average farm size in the model, 
as farm input prices increase (decrease) causing loan 
demand to increase (decrease), a bank's eligible capital 
account must increase (decrease) causing loan supply to 
increase (decrease) so that excess loan demand is met. 
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Further, with just K and e allowed to change, an increase 
(decrease) in farm input prices must be matched by the pro­
portional increase (decrease) in a bank's eligible capital 
account as set out in Equation (3.12). 
This situation can be shown graphically in terms of 
Figures 3.6 and 3.8. For the rightward (leftward) shift in 
the loan demand curve caused by an increase (decrease) in 
farm input prices, a compensating rightward (leftward) shift 
in the loan supply curve caused by, in this case, an increase 
(decrease) in a bank's eligible capital account is needed to 
attain equilibrium at the fixed level of interest rates. 
Finally, assume that de = 0 in order that an analysis 
of changes in a emd K may be made. This yields : 
dK = I da. (3.13) 
Equation (3.13) states that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in average farm size, a, must be accompanied by a 
proportional increase (decrease) in a bank's eligible capital 
account, K. for excess loan demand to be satisfied. The 
size of an increase (decrease) in K needed to offset the in­
crease (decrease) in a depends upon the size of the coeffi­
cient of da. With interest rates and farm prices received 
and paid fixed, as average farm size increases (decreases) 
and causes a decrease (increase) in loan supply, a bank's 
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eligible capital account must proportionally increase (de­
crease) to cause loan supply to increase (decrease), thereby 
offsetting the effect of the change in average farm size. 
If these changes in a and K are attained as set out in 
Equation (3.13), then excess loan demand will be zero. 
Graphically, the situation may be seen by use of 
Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. Although none of the 
figures shows a shift in the loan supply curve, a shift in 
the initial loem supply cuirve could be drawn. Suppose a left­
ward (rightward) shift in the loan supply curve occurs because 
of an increase (decrease) in average farm size. Then to get 
the loan supply curve back to its original position, a pro­
portional increa&e (decrease) in a bank's eligible capital 
account must occur, causing the loan supply curve to shift 
rightward (leftward) to its initial level. 
Under the analysis of fixed interest rates, one point 
to note is that, in each case, if the changes in the exo­
genous variables as stated in Equations (3.11), (3.12), 
and (3.13) are not met exactly by changes in other exogenous 
variables, permanent credit rationing may occur. If no 
further adjustments take place, then farm customers will 
have to look to other sources to satisfy their demand for 
credit. 
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Disequilibrium under fixed interest rates 
In this section, disequilibrium is allowed to occur so 
that excess demand for loans (credit rationing) can be 
linked to the exogenous variables in the model. The dis­
equilibrium case will be analyzed under the situation 
of fixed interest rates only. As shown above, if interest 
rates are flexible, then the rural banking market can 
adjust farm loan rates so that no excess demand exists in 
the market for loans. 
With the inclusion of excess demand and fixed interest 
rates, the total differential of Equation (3.6) becomes : 
Assume first that da - 0 and dK = 0, so that the changes 
in e and X can be analyzed. This yields: 
It is seen from Equation (3.15) that a ceteris paribus 
increase (decrease) in the shift parameter, e, causes a 
corresponding increase (decrease) in excess demand. Thus, 
credit rationing is increased. With no increase in loan 
supply provided by the rural bank and fixed interest rates, 
any increase in loam dememd brought about by an increase in 
farm input prices leads to increased credit rationing. 
dX = de + IQK da (3.14) 
(3.15) 
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Graphically, an increase in farm input prices causes the 
loan demand curve to shift to the right. Figures 3.5, 
3.6 and 3.8 show this situation. 
Similarly, to analyze the effects of changes in a amd 
X, let de = 0 and dK = 0. This result is; 
a# ' -;f- > 0- (3.16) 
Equation (3;16) states that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in average farm size, a, causes a proportional 
increase (decrease) in excess demand. As average farm size 
increases, the number of farm customers decreases, and be­
cause of lending limits, loan supply in the banking market de­
creases. The loan supply curve shifts leftward for in­
creases in average farm size, and with no shifts in the loan 
demand curve, increased credit rationing occurs. 
Finally, assume that de = 0 and da = 0, so that 
changes in K and X can be analyzed. This yields: 
AV Â 1 
3# <3-1:1 
Equation (3.17) says that a ceteris paribus increase 
(decrease) in a bank's eligible capital account, K, causes a 
proportional decrease (increase) in excess demand. As 
banks' eligible capital accounts increase (decrease), loan 
supply in the banking market increases (decreases), with no 
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shifts in the loan demand curve, excess demand decreases 
(increases). Thus, under fixed interest rates, dis­
equilibrium in the loan market (credit rationing) may 
occur. 
Summary 
A mathematical model was developed to investigate the 
effects of lending limits on the availability of credit 
to rural borrowers. Under the case with flexible interest 
rates on farm loans, no problems of meeting changes in loan 
demand were encountered in the rural banking market, as 
interest rates adjusted to clear the loan market. But for the 
situation of fixed interest rates, the possibility of credit 
rationing existed. It was further seen that in order for 
changes in excess loan demand to be satisfied under fixed 
interest rate conditions, certain proportional and simul­
taneous changes in exogenous variables had to be fulfilled. 
If these changes were not met, then disequilibrium in the 
loan market occurred and credit rationing existed. 
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CHAPTER IV. AN EMPIRICAL ADAPTATION 
OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
In the development of the theoretical model, an ex­
cess loan demand equation was derived, in which excess 
loeui demêuid depended upon a shift parameter (which included 
the effect of such factors as prices paid by the farm 
sector), the average of interest rates on farm loans, the 
average farm size in the rural bank market area, and the 
size of the rural banks' eligible capital accounts. The total 
differential of the excess loan demand equation was derived 
as: 
dX = de - Bdr + ^  1 K da - ^  1 dK, (4.1) A O CL O 
and the comparative statics of the model were analyzed. 
To investigate the relationships êunong the variables of the 
mathematical model, it is necessary to quantify the vari­
ables and select an appropriate statistical model for the 
analysis. 
An empirical measurement of the excess demand for loans 
is presented first amd then the statistical model euid an 
empirical measurement of factors affecting excess demand for 
loans is given. Next, an explanation of the use of probit 
analysis with multiple regression is presented. Finally, a 
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discussion of the expected signs of the independent variables, 
as implied from theory, is given. 
Empirical Measurement of Excess 
Demand for Loams 
A problem with an empirical analysis of the theoretical 
excess demand construct is that information on individual 
loans is unavailable. Furthermore, proxy measures of excess 
loan demand, as was noted in the discussion of the credit 
rationing literature, are difficult to develop euid may be 
inadequate. 
One source of data that is available to analyze excess 
loam demand is a survey of agricultural banks^ in the Seventh 
2 Federal Reserve District by The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago. As in the discussion of the mathematical model, 
which incorporated the effect of legal lending limits at 
the individual bank level, the Chicago Fed survey asks 
about banks' individual legal lending limits in relationship 
to customer credit needs. The following question was 
asked of the bemks in the survey: "Compared to five years 
ago (end of 1974 compared to end of 1979), is the number of 
actual or potential farm customers in your area whose credit 
needs exceed your bank's individual legal lending limit higher, 
^Agricultural banks, in this survey, are banks that have 
50 percent or more of their total loans in farm loans. 
2 The Seventh Federal Reserve District includes Iowa, and 
parts of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. 
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lower, or unchanged?" The survey was answered by 526 banks, 
of which 276 banks reported more farm customers, 39 banks 
reported fewer farm customers, and 211 banks reported no 
change in the number of farm customers from 1974 to 1979 whose 
credit needs exceeded their bank's individual legal lending 
limit. Because very few banks responded that they had fewer 
farm customers in their area whose credit needs exceeded 
their individual legal lending limit in 1979 than in 1974, it 
was decided to combine the banks reporting no change in the 
number of farm customers with those banks reporting fewer farm 
customers. Thus, the responses show that 276 banks reported 
more farm customers in their area whose credit needs exceeded 
their bank's individual legal lending limit in 1979 than in 
1974, and 250 beuiks reported not more (either less or no 
change in the number of) farm customers in their area whose 
credit needs exceeded their bank's individual legal lending 
limit in 1979 than in 1974. 
The responses from the Chicago Fed survey can be 
used as an indicator of excess demand for loans. If a bank 
reported that it had more farm customers in its market area 
in 1979 than in 1974 whose credit needs exceeded the bank's 
individual legal lending limit, then a greater excess demand 
for loans, in terms of legal lending limits, occurred at 
the bank in 1979 tham in 1974. Conversely, if a bank 
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reported that it had fewer, or the same number of, farm 
customers in its market area in 1979 than in 1974 whose 
credit needs exceeded the bank's individual legal lending 
limit, then excess demand for loans, in terms of legal 
lending limits, remained the same or decreased over the 1974 
to 1979 time interval. 
For modelling purposes, the responses were categorized 
as 0, 1 variables, where : 
Response = 0 if the bank reported not more farm customers 
in its area whose credit needs exceeded the 
bank's individual legal lending limit in 
1979 than in 1974, and; 
Response = 1 if the bank reported more farm customers in 
its area whose credit needs exceeded the 
bank's individual legal lending limit 
in 1979 than in 1974. 
Because this response is an indicator of changes in excess 
demand for loans, it is treated as the dependent variable in 
the statistical model. 
Empirical Measurement of Factors Affecting 
Excess Demand For Loans 
In the discussion of the empirical measurement uf 
factors affecting excess demand for loans, the statistical 
model will first be presented. Then an explanation of each 
independent variable of the model will be given. 
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Statistical model 
Because the dependent variable measures a reponse that 
indicates a change in lending difficulty (in terms of a bank 
individual legal lending limit) from 1974 to 1979, the inde­
pendent variables used to explain this response are also 
expressed as differenced variables over the same time period 
The statistical model to be fit is as follows: 
= a + BAAFS^ + yAMV^ + pAAPE^ + + TAK^ + 6D^ + 
i = 1,...,526 (4.2) 
where ; 
? response variable of rural bank "i"; 
a = intercept term; 
AFS. = average farm size in the area serviced by rural 
^ bank "i"; 
MV. = per-acre market value of agricultural products 
sold in the area serviced by rural bank "i"; 
APE. = per-acre agricultural production expenses in the 
area serviced by rural bank "i"; 
U. = utilization of capacity of farmland in the area 
serviced by rural bank "i", measured as total 
cropland/total lemd in farms; 
= eligible capital account of rural bank "i"; 
Dj^ = dummy variable for bank type, where 
Du = 0 if rural bank "i" is a unit bank, 
Du = 1 if rural bank "i" is a branch bank; 
e. = error term, assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
independent variables ; and 
86 
the A's indicate changes in the independent variables. The 
independent variables MV^, APE^, and can be thought of 
as scale variables, as represented by the variable "e" 
of the loam demand equation in the mathematical model. The 
independent variables and represent the bank capital 
variables and reflect the size and type of bank. The dummy 
variable for bank type enters into the analysis because of 
its relationship to bank capital stock. If a bank is part 
of a branching system, then the capital base applicable for 
lending limits is that for the entire branching system and not 
just for the individual bank. 
Independent variables in the model 
Average farm size The average size of farm, measured 
in acres, is taken from the Census of Agriculture reports 
for 1974 and 1978.^ The data are on a county basis. The 
farms used in this study had sales of $2,500 or more, 
because the farms with larger operations are the farms 
likely to have borrowing requirements exceeding a rural 
bank's individual legal lending limit. 
The Census of Agriculture reports normally come out 
once every five years, which would have meant a census in 
1979. An extrapolation of the farm data to 1979 was not 
performed because of the lack of observations from previous 
censuses. 
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Market value of agricultural products sold The market 
value of agricultural products sold, which is a measure of 
farm income, is denominated in dollars per-acre amd is also 
taken from the Census of Agriculture county reports. It in­
cludes the value of crops, livestock and livestock products, 
and poultry and poultry products. 
Agricultural production expenses Agricultural pro­
duction expenses are also measured in dollars per-acre and 
again are taken from the Census of Agriculture county 
reports. These production expenses include livestock and 
poultry purchases, feed purchases for livestock and poultry, 
animal health costs, seeds, bulbs, plants, and trees 
purchased, commercial fertilizer and other agricultural 
chemical costs, hired farm and contract labor costs, custom-
work and machine hire costs, and gasoline and other petro­
leum products purchased. 
Utilization of capacity of farmland The utilization 
of capacity of farmland is defined as the ratio 
total^la^d°fn^?trms- cropland and total land in farms 
are measured in acres. The data are taken from the Census of 
Agriculture county reports. 
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Eligible capital account The eligible capital 
account, to which dollar lending limits are related, varies 
for state and national banks. For the state banks in the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District, the eligible capital 
account varies from 15 to 20 percent of a bank's common 
stock, preferred stock, surplus, and subordinated notes euid 
debentures. For national banks, the eligible capital account 
is 10 percent of a bank's common stock, preferred stock, 
surplus, subordinated notes and debentures, undivided profits, 
one-half of reserve for loan losses, and reserve for con­
tingencies. Table 2.1 shows the eligible capital accounts 
for national and state banks in the Seventh Federal Reserve 
District in detail. Data for capital accounts were taken 
from Call Reports of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
Dummy variable for bank type To capture differences 
in responses between unit and branch banks, a dummy vari­
able for bank type was included in the model. For a unit 
bank, the dummy variable is set equal to zero, and for a 
branch bank, the dummy variable is set equal to one. Data 
for the dummy variable for bank type were obtained from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
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Adjustment for market areas 
Each of the farm variables (AFS, MV, APE, and U) should 
be measured for the area which a rural bank services. 
The farm data obtained from the Census of Agriculture are 
given on a county basis. However, the market area a rural 
bank services and the county in which the bank is located 
may not be one and the same. Thus, some adjustment to 
county data is appropriate to capture the nature of bamking 
markets. The following arbitrary scheme was devised: 
If a rural bank is close (a distance of ten miles or 
less), to a neighboring county, then that county's farm data 
is assumed to exert an influence on the rural bank's loan 
demand. The county in which a rural bank is located, however, 
is assigned a greater weight than neighboring counties. 
2 Specifically, a weight where n is the number of 
counties (including the county containing the rural bank) 
exerting an influence on the rural bank's loan demand is 
assigned to the county in which the rural bank is located, 
and a weight is assigned to each neighboring county 
exerting an influence on the rural bank's loan demand. 
As em example, suppose that a rural bank is located 
in the corner of county A such that counties B, C, and 0 are 
within ten miles of the bank. Thus» n > 4. Then the data of 
county A is assigned a weight of two-fifths and the data of 
counties B, C, amd D are each given a weight of one-fifth. 
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Use of Probit Analysis with 
Multiple Regression 
In most cases in which an analysis of economic survey 
data is performed, the dependent variable ceui take on a 
large number of possible values along a natural scale. For 
dependent variables of this type, the theory of multiple 
regression provides an appropriate statistical model. How­
ever, if the dependent variable is dichotomous, that is, it 
can take on only two values (usually 0 and 1), then the use 
of multiple regression is inappropriate. By definition, the 
expected value of a dichotomous dependent variable must 
always fall in the interval (0, 1), regardless of the 
values of the independent variables. In multiple regression, 
however, because the expected value of the dependent variable 
is assumed to be a linear combination of the independent 
variables, the expected value of the dependent variable could 
fall outside the (0, 1) interval. That would violate the 
condition of the (0, 1) interval for the expected value of 
a dichotomous dependent variable. 
Probit analysis provides an appropriate model to 
constrain the expected value of the dichotomous dependent 
variable to the (0, 1) interval. The probit analysis model 
has a long history in biometrics (see, for example, Finney, 
1971). In biological assay, probit analysis is used to 
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determine the relationship between the probability that 
organisms will be killed to the strength of the dose of 
poison administered to them. The dependent variable, for each 
organism in the seunple, is dichotomous: killed or not 
killed. Moreover, each organism is assumed to have a dosage 
threshold, such that a stronger dose will kill that organism 
and a weaker dose will not. Over the population of organisms 
of a given kind, the logarithms of these dosage thresholds are 
assumed to be normally distributed, with mean and standard 
deviation estimated from the data by maximum likelihood. 
In econometrics, the probit analysis model is rela­
tively new. Farrell (1954) applied probit analysis to 
economic survey data to analyze the relationship between 
ownership of automobiles and income. In Farrell's applica­
tion, the dependent variable is defined by whether or not 
the household owned a car of a given age or younger. Each 
household is assumed to have an income threshold, such that 
if its income is larger than the critical value, the house­
hold owns a car, while if its income is below the threshold, 
the household does not own a car. The logarithms of the in­
come thresholds are assumed to be normally distributed. The 
parêuneters of the distribution are estimated by maximum like­
lihood from data giving the number of seunple households 
observed to own and not to own a car at various income levels. 
In Farrell's application, there is only one independent 
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variable, income, to which the dependent variable, proba­
bility of car ownership, is related. Typically, economic 
relationships involve two or more independent variables 
to which the dependent variable is related. Tobin (1955) 
defines the maximum likelihood estimators and shows an 
iterative estimation procedure for the application of multi­
variate probit analysis to economic survey data. Tobin 
develops an index I, which is a linear combination of the 
independent variables, that determines whether the dependent 
variable has the value 0 or 1. He then establishes a critical 
value for the index. If the actual value of the index equals 
or exceeds the critical value for the index, then, the depen­
dent variable will be 1; if the actual value of the index is 
less theui the critical value for the index, then the dependent 
variable will be Q. 
The critical values of the index are assumed to be 
normally distributed over the population. Then Tobin 
determines the probability that, given the index I, the 
dependent variable for each element of the population will be 
equal to 1, cuid the probability that, given the index I, the 
dependent variable for each element of the population will be 
equal to 0. Tobin then determines the maximum likelihood 
estimates and shows an iterative estimation procedure for the 
model. 
Probit analysis thus yields an estimate of the probability 
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that the dependent variable occurs, given the thresholds of 
the independent variables. As applied to this study, probit 
analysis gives an estimation of the probability that a 
rural bank had more farm customers whose credit needs 
exceeded the bank's individual legal lending limit in 1979 
than in 1974, given the thresholds of the various inde­
pendent variables of the model. 
To illustrate the application of probit analysis 
to bank survey response, let I be an index which is a linear 
function of the regressors: = X^B, let I* be a N(0, 1) 
variable, emd let the value of y^ be determined as follows: 
Yt - 1 " i It 
Yt = 0 if < I*. (4.3) 
Each y^ is thus a function of the X^'s (via I^) and of 
I^. The I*'s, which play the role of disturbances, may be 
interpreted as critical values of the index. If, for 
example, "y" = bank survey response, and "x" = change in 
agricultural production expenses from 1974 to 1979 in the 
area serviced by a bank, an individual bank with a high 
I* would respond that it had more farm customers whose 
credit needs exceeded its individual legal lending limit 
in 1979 than in 1974 only if the change in agricultural 
production expenses from 1974 to 1979 is so high that 
^ I*. An analogous interpretation can be given for the 
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other independent variables in the model. 
Letting F(z) = value of the standard normal cumulative 
distribution at z yields : 
in view of the fact that I* is N(0, 1). The fact that I, and 
hence the probabilities, is a function of the B's suggests 
maximum likelihood estimation of the B's. Without loss of 
generality, suppose the survey sample is ordered so that 
the first S observations have y = 1, and the remaining T-S 
observations have y - 0. Then the likelihood of the sample 
is : 
Prob {y = 1/1} = Probd* < 1/1} = F (I) (4.4) 
and 
Prob {y = 0/1} = Prob{I* > 1/1} = l-F(I) (4.5) 
H = F(Ij^) . . . F(Ig) • [l-F(Ig+i)] . . . [l-F(I^)] 
(4.6) 
with logarithmic likelihood: 
s T 
L = Z log F(I. ) + Z 
t=l t=s+l 
log[l-F(I^)] (4.7) 
in which each term is a function of the B's: 
(4.8) 
Setting the derivatives of the logarithmic likelihood 
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equation with respect to the B's equal to zero gives the 
normal equations determining the maximum likelihood esti­
mators, the B's. The normal equations are, of course, 
nonlinear. 
In the probit model, the conditional expectation is 
given by; 
E(yt/It) = Prob {y^ = l/I^} = F(I^) , (4.9) 
the ordinate of the cumulative normal distribution, which 
necessarily falls in the unit interval, and which forms 
an S-shaped curve. The estimated expectation is = 
F(I^) = F(X^§), which has the same properties. Through the 
use of the standard normal cumulative distribution developed 
earlier and the density function for the standard normal 
random variable, the coefficients of the probit equation 
are transformed so that an interpretation of the coeffi­
cients, similar to those obtained in ordinary least squares 
regression, is obtained. 
Hypothesized Signs of the 
Independent Variables 
From the theoretical model, the hypothesized sign of 
the average-farm-size variable is positive. This means 
that the larger the increase in average farm size in the area 
serviced by a rural bank, the more likely it is that more 
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farm customers' borrowing requirements exceed the bank's 
individual legal lending limit. 
The sign on the variable market value of agricultural 
products sold is ambiguous. If the sign is negative, then 
the larger the increase in the market value of agricultural 
products sold, the less likely it is that more farm customers' 
credit needs exceed the bank's individual legal lending 
limit. Because the market-value variable is a farm-income 
variable, a negative sign indicates that farm income is being 
used as a substitute for borrowing. If the sign on the 
market-value variable is positive, then the larger the in­
crease in the market value of agricultural products sold, 
the more likely it is that the rural bank has more farm 
customers with credit needs exceeding its individual legal 
lending limit. In this case, the market-value variable and 
loêui demand are complements. That is, as the market-value of 
agricultural products sold increases, loan demand increases, 
perhaps because the farm operation is expanding. The results 
of Sealey (1979) indicate that the sign on the market-
value variable is positive. 
The expected sign on the agricultural-production-ex­
penses variable is positive. The larger the increase in agri­
cultural production expenses in the area serviced by a rural 
bank, the more likely it is that the rural bank has more farm 
customers with credit needs in excess of its individual legal 
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lending limit. 
The sign on the utilization-of-capacity variable is ex­
pected to be positive. This indicates that the more in­
tensively farmland is cultivated in the area serviced by a 
rural bank, the more likely it is that the rural bank has more 
farm customers with borrowing requirements exceeding its indi­
vidual legal lending limit. 
The expected sign on the eligible-capital-account vari­
able is negative. That is, the larger the increase in a rural 
bank's eligible capital account, the less likely it is that 
the rural bank has more farm customers whose credit needs 
exceed its individual legal lending limit. 
The expected sign on the bank-type-dummy variable is 
negative. Because a branch bank has a larger eligible capital 
account to draw from than does a unit bank, a branch bank 
should be less likely to have more farm customers with credit 
requirements in excess of its individual legal lending limit 
than a unit bank. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
In Chapter IV, it was hypothesized that the variables 
of average farm size, a bank's eligible capital account, 
agricultural production expenses, market value, utilization 
of capacity of farmland, and bank type (branch or unit) 
were significant variables in an explanatory model of 
banks' survey responses to whether or not their banks had more 
farm customers whose credit requirements exceeded their legal 
lending limits in 1979 than in 1974. A multivariate probit 
model was formulated as follows to estimate the parameters 
involved in these relationships: 
0, if I. < I* for all i, i=l,2,...,526 
^i = 1, if I^ > I| (5-1) 
where : 
= the response of the ith bank, 
I. = a + B,AAFS. + B_AEKA. + B,AAPE. + B.AMV. 
+ BgAUC^ + BgD^, 
I* = the threshold level of the ith bank, 
AFS. - average farm size in the market area serviced 
by the ith bank, 
EKAj^ = eligible capital account of the ith bank, 
APEi = agricultural production expenses in the market 
area serviced by the ith bank. 
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MV. = market value of agricultural products sold in 
the market area serviced by the ith bank, 
UC. = utilization of capacity, that is, the ratio of 
total acres of cropland to total acres in 
farmlamd, in the market area serviced by the ith 
bank, amd 
Dj^ = dummy variable for bank type of the ith bank, where 
DL = 0 if the ith bank is a unit bank, 
= 1 if the ith bank is a branch bank. 
The A's indicate changes in the variables from 1974 
to 1978. 
In the next section, a presentation of the statistical 
results is given. The parameter estimates for the full 
data set, as well as for partitions of the data set are 
presented. Also, the results for selected deposit size 
classes are given. 
Statistical Results 
The statistical model was first estimated using the full 
data set. Then, because of the differences in farming 
operations, the model was run for the Corn-Belt states 
(Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa) amd for the states of Michigan 
and Wisconsin. The results of the three models are pre­
sented in Table 5.1. The correlation coefficient matrices for 
the independent variables of the models are given in the 
Appendix, and do not give evidence of multicollinearity. 
As Table 5.1 shows, the variables of eligible capital 
account and dummy variable for bank type are highly 
Table 5.1. Probit estimates for Seventh District states (Full) model, Corn-Belt 
states (C-B) model,& and Michigan-Wisconsin (M-W) model 
Independent Models 
variables Full C-B M-W 
Constant term .0775 .0903 .1436 
( !  .78)° ( !  .48) (' .25) 
Average farm size .0039 .0044 .007 
( .  ,58) ( .  18) (' .13) 
Eligible capital account — ^ .0013 .0007 — , .0006 
.01) .01) ( .02) 
Agricultural production expenses .0116 .018 .0116 
( .09) (' .01) ( .03) 
Market value of agricultural products sold -, .0036 _ ^ .0019 .0031 
( .30) ( .26) ( .20) 
Utilization of capacity of farmland -10 .43 -5 .69 .9847 
( .09) ( .12) ( .76) 
Dummy variable for bank type _ .3229 .1492 _ .0162 
( .01) ( .01) ( .86) 
^Includes the parts of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa that are located in the 
Seventh Federal Reserve District. 
^Includes the parts of Michigan and Wisconsin that are located in the Seventh 
Federal Reserve District. 
^Figures in parentheses indicate levels of significance for the coefficients. 
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significant in explaining banks' survey responses for the Full 
model. The variables of agricultural production expenses and 
utilization of capacity of farmland are also significant (at 
the 10 percent level) in explaining banks' survey responses, 
but the sign on the utilization-of-capacity-of-farmland 
variable is not as hypothesized. On the other hand, the 
variables of market value of agricultural products sold amd 
average farm size performed poorly. The negative sign on the 
coefficient of the market-value-of-agricultural-products-
sold variable indicates that an increase in farm income is 
associated with banks reporting that they had fewer farm 
customers in 1979 them in 1974 whose credit needs exceeded 
legal lending limits. However, the coefficient of the 
market-value-of-agricultural-products-sold variable is in­
significant in explaining banks' survey responses. 
The performance of the average-farm-size variable is 
particularly disappointing. Not only is the average-farm-
size variable highly insignificant in explaining banks' survey 
responses, it is also of the wrong sign. 
The Corn-Belt states (C-B) Model also exhibits highly 
significant coefficients on the eligible-capital-account and 
bank-type-dummy variables. However, the sign on the eligible-
capital -account variable is wrong. This is puzzling, given 
that an increase in a rural bank's eligible capital account 
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should serve to decrease the number of farm customers exceeding 
a bank's legal lending limit. 
The performance of the agricultural-production-expenses 
variable in the C-B Model is better than in the Full Model. 
The coefficient on the agricultural-production-expenses 
variable exhibits the postulated sign (positive) and a high 
level of significance (1 percent level). 
The coefficients of the average-farm-size and market-
value-of-agricultural-products-sold variables in the C-B Model 
show a higher level of significance than the coefficients of 
the Full Model, but are still below the 10 percent signifi­
cance level. The sign on the coefficient of the average-
farm-size variable is also incorrect. Similarly, the sign on 
the coefficient of the utilization-of-capacity-of-farmland 
variable is incorrect. 
The Michigan-Wisconsin (M-W) Model shows the coefficient 
on the eligible-capital-account variable to be highly sig­
nificant and of the correct sign. The coefficient on the 
bank-type-dummy variable, however, is highly insignificant. 
On the other hand, the sign on the coefficient of the 
agricultural-production-expenses variable is incorrect, but 
registers significance at the 3 percent level. 
The sign on the coefficient of the average-farm-size 
variable is correct in the M-W Model and approaches the 10 
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percent level of significance. Both the coefficients of the 
market-value-of-agricultural-products-sold variable and the 
utilization-of-capacity-of-farmland variable have positive 
signs, but are insignificant. 
To determine if differences exist in banks' survey 
responses because of variations in bank size (as measured 
by the level of total deposits), the model was estimated for 
three deposit size classes: banks with less than $15 million 
in deposits (as of year end 1979); banks with deposits 
greater than or equal to $15 million and less than or equal to 
$50 million; and, banks with deposits greater than $50 million. 
The results of the three models are presented in Table 5.2. 
The correlation coefficient matrices for the independent vari­
ables of the three models are given in the Appendix and do not 
show evidence of multicollinearity. 
The results of the model for the smallest deposit size 
class in Table 5.2 indicate a high level of significance for 
the bank-type-dummy variable. The sign on the coefficient of 
the eligible-capital-account variable is correct, but the 
coefficient of the eligible-capital-account variable barely 
misses significance at the ten percent level. Similarly, the 
sign on the coefficient of the agricultural-production-
expenses variable is correct, but the significance level 
of the coefficient falls beyond the 10 percent level. 
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Table 5.2. Problt estimates for selected deposit size (DS) 
classes of Seventh Federal Reserve District 
states^ (in millions of dollars) 
Independent Models 
variables DS<15 15<DS<50 DS>50 
Constant term 
Average farm size 
Eligible capital account 
Agricultural production 
expenses 
Market value of agricultural 
products sold 
Utilization of capacity of 
farmland 
Dummy variable for bcuik type 
.201 
(.20) 
-.0067 
(.21) 
- . 0 0 2 8  
(.13) 
.0064 
(.14) 
-.0036 
(.09) 
-14.51 
(.01) 
-.3066 
(.01) 
.1609 
(.23) 
.0017 
( . 6 8 )  
- . 0 0 0 2  
(.74) 
.0038 
(.37) 
-.0015 
(.48) 
1.54 
( . 8 8 )  
-.1662 
(.01) 
.1901 
( . 2 6 )  
- . 0 0 2 6  
(.57) 
.0004 
(.07) 
-.0005 
(.93) 
.0022 
(.43) 
-6.24 
(.12) 
.0031 
(.98) 
^Deposit size as of yearend 1979. 
^Figures in parentheses indicate levels of significance 
for the coefficients. 
The coefficients of the market-value-of-agricultural-
products-sold variable and the utilization-of-capacity-of-
farmland variable are significant at the 10 percent level. 
However, the sign on the coefficient of the utilization-of-
capacity-of-farmland variable is incorrect. The average-
105 
farm-size variable again performs poorly, with its coeffi­
cients exhibiting a lack of significance and the incorrect 
sign. 
The model for the medium deposit size class also shows 
a high level of significance for the bank-type-dummy vari­
able. None of the other variables exhibits significance 
at the 10 percent level, but the coefficients of all vari­
ables, including average farm size, are of the correct sign. 
None of the coefficients of the variables in the model 
for the large deposit size class are of the correct sign. 
Only one of the variables (eligible capital account) has a 
coefficient significant at the 10 (or less) percent level. 
Of particular note is the extremely high insignificance level 
of the coefficient on the bank-type-dummy variable. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the 
effects of lending limits on the availability of credit to 
agricultural borrowers. A graphical and simple theoretical 
analysis incorporating the effects of lending limits on 
agricultural credit were developed. The theoretical model 
related excess dememd for loans in a rural banking market to 
average farm size, size of banks' eligible capital accounts, 
and a shift parameter. 
A statistical model was developed to modify the simple 
theoretical model by employing bank survey responses. The 
survey responses were to a question asking if a beuik had more 
(or less) farm customers in 1979 tham in 1974 whose credit 
requirements exceeded the bank's lending limit. The survey 
sample included 526 banks from those parts of Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin in the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District. 
The bank survey responses were used as an indication of 
excess loan demand. Bank survey response was taken as the 
dependent variable and was regressed on average farm size, 
agricultural production expenses, market value of agri­
cultural products sold, utilization of capacity of farmland, 
a bank's eligible capital account, and a dummy variable for 
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bank type. Separate estimations were made for six different 
models—a Full Model which included the full data set, a model 
for the states of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, a model for 
the states of Michigêui and Wisconsin, and three models for 
selected deposit size classes. 
The empirical results show that the eligible-capital-
account and bêmk-type-dummy variables are highly significant 
in explaining bank survey responses in the Full Model. The 
agriculture-production-expenses variable is also found to be 
significantly related to bank survey response in the Full, 
as well as in the Corn-Belt states. Model. The average-farm-
size and the utilization-of-capacity-of-farmland variables 
performed poorly in all of the models. The market-value-
of-agricultural-products-sold variable, though not exhibiting 
signifiance in the models, is of the hypothesized sign. 
Conclusions 
The results of the models show that bank survey 
responses are more highly influenced by "bank structure" 
variables, that is, eligible-capital-account and bank-type-
dummy variables, than by the "farm" variables of average 
farm size, agricultural production expenses, market value 
of agricultural products sold, and utilization of capacity 
of farmland. This phenomenon is not too surprising, given 
that the lending limit problem from the banking sector's 
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point of view is more closely tied to variables under its 
control than to variables outside its supervision. 
In terms of the theoretical model, however, those vari­
ables reflecting agricultural credit requirements play an 
important role in the lending limit problem also. The only 
variable reflecting agricultural credit requirements that 
exhibits the correct sign and is significant in explaining 
bank survey responses is the agricultural-production-
expenses variable. This result most likely occurs because 
agricultural production expenses more closely measure farm 
credit requirements than do the other "farm" variables. 
The variaUale "market value of agricultural products 
sold", though not significantly related to bank survey 
response, has a negative sign, as expected, in most of the 
models. This indicates that farm income, via the proxy 
measure "market value of agricultural products sold", may serve 
as a substitute for farm credit. That is, farmers may use 
equity as a substitute for debt in supporting their operations. 
As the market value of agricultural products sold increases, the 
probability that bamks will have more farm customers whose 
credit requests exceed their legal lending limit decreases, 
thus indicating a decrease in excess farm loan demand. This 
result is contrary to the findings of Sealey (1979), who 
found a positive relationship between income and loan demand. 
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Sealey, however, used data from business firms. 
The performance of the utilization-of-capacity-of-farm-
land and average-farm-size variables is poor. In most of 
the models, not only do these variables show a lack of 
significance in explaining bank survey response, they also 
have the incorrect sign. These results are particularly 
surprising for the average-farm-size variable. Previous 
studies by Benjamin (1980) and Riffe (1979) indicate that 
the growth in average farm size is an important factor in 
the lending limit problem. 
Perhaps the poor performance of the average-farm-
size variable, and the utilization-of-capacity-of-farmland 
variable, can be explained by the short time period used 
in this study. The four-year time frame may have been too 
brief to indicate the effects of changes in these long-
run structural variables on bank survey response. 
Another possible explanation for the poor performance 
of the average-farm-size and utilization-of-capacity-of-
farmland variables is that their effect on bank survey 
response may be picked up by the agricultural-production-
expenses variable. Agricultural production expenses are 
probably more closely related to farm credit requests than 
average farm size and utilization of capacity of farm land. 
Thus, the effect of agricultural production expenses on bank 
survey response may overshadow the effects of average farm size 
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and utilization of capacity of farmland. 
The performance of the bank-type-dummy variable, on the 
other hand, is very good in most of the models. The nega­
tive sign on the bamk-type-dummy variable indicates that 
breuich banks have less trouble in satisfying large farm 
loan customers than do unit banks. That is because the 
capital base applicable to lending limits is that for the 
entire branching system and not just for the individual bank. 
This evidence that branch banks have less difficulty 
in servicing agric^ 
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and utilization of capacity of farmland. 
The performance of the bank-type-dummy variable, on the 
other hand, is very good in most of the models. The nega­
tive sign on the bank-type-dummy variable indicates that 
branch banks have less trouble in satisfying large farm 
loan customers than do unit banks. That is because the 
capital base applicable to lending limits is that for the 
entire branching system and not just for the individual bank. 
This evidence that bremch banks have less difficulty 
in servicing agricultural loam requests has implications 
for the banking sector in the unit versus branch banking 
controversy. In terms of the effects of lending limits 
on the availability of credit to agricultural borrowers, 
banks that are part of a branching system have less 
trouble in servicing large farm loem requests than do unit 
banks. This implies that branching laws could be relaxed 
in states where branching is restricted or prohibited, 
particularly in those states where large individual farm 
loan requests are prevalent. 
Furthermore, when the model is estimated using parti­
tions of the data set according to deposit size, the bank-
type-dummy variable indicates more difficulty for small 
unit banks tham for large unit banks in servicing large 
farm loans. For banks with deposit size less than or equal 
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to $50 million, the bemk-type-dummy variable is highly 
significant in explaining bank survey response and is 
correct in sign. On the other hand, for banks with deposit 
size greater than $50 million, the bank-type-dummy variable 
is highly insignificant in explaining bank survey response 
and is incorrect in sign. Large unit banks have a broader 
capital base with which to satisfy large farm loans than 
do small unit banks. Thus, in terms of lending limits 
and the availability of credit to agricultural borrowers, 
small unit banks could benefit from branching. 
Some Suggestions for Future 
Research 
One of the drawbacks of this study is the lack of 
farm loan data for individual borrowers at banks. Though 
in practice it's impossible to obtain these data, a more 
detailed survey of agricultural banks regarding lending 
limits could provide useful insight into solutions for 
the lending limit problem. Information, such as whether 
the loans exceeding individual lending limits are for 
livestock or grain, could be collected to better under­
stand the credit requirements for different types of loans 
at individual banks. 
Another suggestion is to modify the model to better 
reflect farm credit requirements. Data on the purchase of 
machinery and information on land values could be included 
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in the model to help explain bank survey response. Lastly, 
the market area serviced by an agricultural bank could be 
defined more precisely so that the effects of variables 
indicative of agricultural credit requirements on bank 
survey response can be better ascertained. 
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APPENDIX 
Correlation coefficient matrix—Full Model: 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 -.03 -.07 -.02 -.04 .26 
AFS -.03 1.00 -.34 -.13 -.31 -.16 
MV -.07 -.34 1.00 .58 .01 -.02 
APE -.02 -.13 .58 1.00 -.03 .03 
UC -.04 -.31 .01 — .03 1.00 .14 
D .26 -.16 -.02 .03 .14 1.00 
Correlation coefficient matrix—Corn-Belt States Model: 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.07 .24 
AFS -.01 1.00 -.26 -.24 -.05 -.21 
MV -.03 —. 26 1.00 .67 .06 .06 
APE -.04 -.24 .67 1.00 .07 .11 
UC -.07 -.05 .06 .07 1.00 .17 
D .24 -.21 .06 .11 .17 1.00 
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Correlation coefficient matrix—Michigan-Wisconsin Model ; 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 —. 06 -.14 .03 -.01 .36 
AFS —, 06 1.00 -.42 .03 -.47 .02 
MV -.14 -.42 1.00 .45 -.09 -.27 
APE .03 .03 .45 1.00 -.12 -.10 
UC -.01 -.47 -.09 -.12 1.00 .01 
D .36 .02 -.27 -.10 .01 1.00 
Correlation coefficient matrix—Smallest Deposit Size Class 
Model: 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 .01 -.13 -.12 .05 .07 
AFS .01 1.00 -.45 -.27 -.13 -.04 
MV -.13 -.45 1.00 .52 .08 .01 
APE -.12 -.27 .52 1.00 .08 —. 06 
UC .05 -.13 .08 .08 1.00 -.03 
D .07 -.04 .01 —. 06 -.03 1.00 
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Correlation coefficient matrix—Medium Deposit Size Class 
Model: 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 .09 -.12 -.09 -.15 .06 
AFS .09 1.00 -.44 -.17 -.09 -.09 
MV -.12 -.44 1.00 .63 .08 — , 02 
APE -.09 -.17 .63 1.00 .06 .05 
UC -.15 -.09 .08 .06 1.00 .14 
D .06 -.09 -.02 .05 .14 1.00 
Correlation coefficient matrix—Largest Deposit Size Class 
Model: 
EKA AFS MV APE UC D 
EKA 1.00 .04 -.10 .07 -.12 -.01 
AFS .04 1.00 -.14 .03 -.58 -.30 
MV -.10 -.14 1.00 .57 -.11 .01 
APE .07 .03 .57 1.00 -.20 .18 
UC -.12 -.58 -.11 -.20 1.00 .16 
D -.01 -.30 .01 .18 .16 1.00 
